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Abstract
One important element of a patent regime is the non-obviousness requirement, which captures
the minimum improvement to the best patented technology a new invention is required to make in
order for it to be patentable. We call it the required inventive step. We explore the implications
of a patenting regime based on required inventive step, by incorporating such intellectual property
protection considerations in the quality-improvement model of technology, trade and growth developed
by Eaton and Kortum (European Economic Review 2001). In considering whether to increase the
inventive step, policy-makers trade oﬀ the benefits of a higher rate of innovation against the loss
of consumer surplus as patent-holders enjoy their monopoly pricing power for a longer duration on
average. We first establish that there exists an optimal binding inventive step that maximizes country
welfare under certain reasonable conditions. We then proceed to formulate an open-economy model,
in which countries interact through cross-border trade and firms patent internationally. We focus
on the central case that domestic goods and foreign goods are highly substitutable with each other
so as to contrast with earlier work of Grossman and Lai (American Economic Review 2004), who
analyzed international IPR issues under an alternative regime based on patent length protection and
product innovation. We find that there exists a stable Nash equilibrium of the inventive-step-setting
game between national governments that features over-protection of intellectual property from a global
perspective. Moreover, country governments set higher inventive steps in the open-economy relative
to the closed-economy benchmark. We discuss how these results relate to Grossman and Lai (2004).
Of note, globalization in the form of reduced trade frictions leads countries to raise their equilibrium
inventive steps. Consequently, globalization leads to higher equilibrium research intensities in all
countries.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
As globalization deepens, the protection of intellectual property has become increasingly important to
developed countries. This is because the law of comparative advantage has steered developed countries
towards specialization in R&D- and skill-intensive products, the profits from which are usually sensitive
to intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. Not surprisingly, this has created political pressures on
developed country governments to push for stronger IPR protection from less developed countries. A
major step in this direction was the signing of the TRIPS agreement in 1994, which sought to provide
a set of universal minimum standards for IPR protection and facilitate coordination among countries in
this area. It is widely recognized that TRIPS required developing countries (the South) to substantially
strengthen their IPR standards to catch up with those of the developed world (the North).
Many studies suggest that the North would gain, while the South lose, from a strengthening of
IPR standards as a result of a TRIPS-like agreement. Nevertheless, would the world as a whole gain
from better IPR protection in the South? Is there any theoretical basis for the view that international
coordination in the protection of IPR can improve global welfare? Grossman and Lai (2004) shed light
on this issue by modeling the international protection of IPR in a setting where innovation expands the
available variety of diﬀerentiated products, and where newly-patented products are legally protected from
imitation for a specified duration termed the patent length. A key result in their paper is that a country
with both a larger domestic market for IPR-sensitive goods and a higher innovative capability would
implement stronger IPR protection in equilibrium. Moreover, they identify the existence of a positive
cross-border externality from raising protection, and hence conclude that there is global under-protection
of IPR in Nash equilibrium when country governments set their (enforcement-adjusted) patent lengths
non-cooperatively to maximize their own national welfare.
In practice however, patent protection is accorded in more ways than through the patent length.
Whereas “patent length” captures the duration of monopoly power granted by law, we focus instead in
this paper on an important alternative mode of IPR protection, which we term the “required inventive
step”: Many attempts at innovation often seek to build upon and improve existing products, rather
than to engineer a radically new item. To serve its purpose of encouraging innovation, it is therefore
also imperative for the IPR regime to protect patent-holders from incremental innovation that would
compete away their profits too easily. To this end, patent laws often include clauses – called “non-
obviousness” requirements in the US patent code — that disqualify an innovator from obtaining a new
patent on the basis of minor or trivial changes to existing patents. The concept of “required inventive
step” therefore refers to how much improvement the patent regime requires an innovator to make over
the best patented technology before the new invention is eligible for a patent. In order to focus on the
eﬀects of patentability, we assume that any invention satisfying the inventive step requirement will not
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infringe on any existing patents. In other words, the “leading breadth” is suﬃciently small that it is
never greater than the required inventive step.1 To the best of our knowledge, no work has yet been
done to study the incentives for governments to increase required inventive steps in an open-economy
setting, and the question remains to what extent the Grossman-Lai results would continue to hold when
IPR protection takes this form. This paper presents a first attempt to fill this gap in the literature.
We develop a framework to analyze international IPR issues when protection is based on required in-
ventive step, by incorporating such patenting considerations into Eaton and Kortum’s (2001) benchmark
model of technology, growth and trade. The underlying model of technology in this framework is the
search-based model of innovation of Kortum (1997), in which research eﬀort raises the cumulative stock
of ideas, and innovation takes the form of new ideas that improve the quality of existing goods (rather
than an expansion in the measure of varieties).2 Here, the term quality is synonymous to the labor
productivity of the production technique for the good, as is the common usage in the endogenous growth
literature. In this setting, the natural mode of IPR protection by which to protect existing patent-holders
would be to stipulate a minimum quality improvement (or inventive step) that any innovation would need
to satisfy in order to be eligible for a new patent. We introduce these considerations into the model in the
following way: If z is the quality (labor productivity) of the current best patented idea for a given variety,
any innovation needs to be of quality at least Bz for it to be granted a new patent, where B ≥ 1 is a
country policy parameter. B therefore captures the required inventive step, along the quality dimension
specifically, that is required under the country’s IPR regime, since it is the minimum quality-improving
step that an innovation must attain before it can be considered suﬃciently non-obvious to be patentable.3
In particular, if B is strictly greater than one, then the inventive step requirement has some real bite.
We show how to build this formulation of IPR protection based on inventive step into a fully-specified
quality-improvement growth model, and use this to investigate how inventive step policy aﬀects innovation
and welfare in both closed and open economy settings. Of note, the stochastic treatment of the innovation
process gives rise to a distribution of the best patented idea that is a function of the current cumulative
stock of ideas and the inventive step policy parameter. The derivation of this patent frontier distribution
is a key step that makes the entire model and the subsequent welfare analysis tractable. This patent
1 In the formal patenting literature, a “non-obviousness” requirement captures how much improvement an invention has
made relative to the prior art in order for it to be eligible for a new patent. On the other hand, “leading breadth” refers
to how much a new innovation needs to better an existing patent before it can be considered not infringing on the latter’s
patent rights. (The innovation need not necessarily be seeking a patent, but the innovator would have to pay royalties to
the existing patent-holder in order to market her innovation.) These two concepts are closely related but distinct. Since
patenting is assumed to be costless in our model, any innovator whose invention satisfies the required inventive step will
automatically patent her new idea.
2The model of Eaton and Kortum (2001) can be viewed as an extension of Kortum (1997) to a multi-country, open-
economy setting.
3We assume that royalty payments are prohibitive, so that no innovator would consider infringing an existing patent. On
the other hand, the cost of filing a patent is assumed to be negligible, while it is easy for competitors to imitate a production
technique. This implies that any innovator would obtain a patent for her technology whenever and wherever it is patentable.
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frontier is closely related to the concept of the technology frontier — the distribution of the most productive
idea currently available — in the standard Eaton and Kortum framework without patenting. (We discuss
this relationship at more length in Section 2.)
We first study the closed-economy version of our model, to obtain insights on the incentives for
extending inventive step protection in this benchmark case. In the closed-economy setting, there is already
a well-developed argument for the existence of an optimal patent length when innovation expands the
available measure of varieties and IPR protection takes this alternative form (see for example, Nordhaus
1969, Tirole 1988, Grossman and Lai 2004): An increase in the patent length raises the incentives for
and hence the rate of innovation, and this is traded oﬀ at the margin against the consumer surplus
conceded to innovating firms.4 We show that a similar existence result holds in our quality-based growth
model, even though a more careful argument is now needed to establish that an increased inventive step
will indeed raise the rate of innovation when innovation improves upon existing varieties rather than
expanding the range of available products. This is because three distinct eﬀects are now at play. First,
for a given patent frontier, a higher inventive step B means that more resources need to be expended
to obtain a new idea that surpasses the inventive step requirement, an eﬀect which tends to lower the
incentives for innovation. On the other hand, a higher B itself leads to a patent frontier distribution that
reflects a lower average quality, since a larger margin of technologically-feasible ideas cannot be marketed;
this actually increases the probability that a new idea can better the patent frontier by a given inventive
step, and thus raises the incentives for innovation. In our model, it turns out that these first two eﬀects
oﬀset each other exact, so that the probability that a new idea improves upon the patent frontier by a
step of at least B is in fact independent of B. This leaves the third eﬀect as the salient one, this being
the direct role of a higher B in raising expected profits once a patent has been obtained, by allowing the
patent-holder to charge a higher markup, while making it more diﬃcult for competitors to leapfrog the
patent.
In sum, the benefit of raising the inventive step is that it increases the overall incentives for innovation,
so that consumers enjoy quality improvements at a faster rate. However, the cost of a higher B is that it
confers patent-holders the ability to charge prices above marginal cost for a longer duration on average,
until a better idea that surpasses the inventive step arrives. Our first key result shows that there exists
a unique inventive step that resolves this tradeoﬀ, and that this optimal B is binding (B∗ > 1) under
certain reasonable conditions. In other words, there is a scope for government intervention through the
use of the inventive step as an instrument in IPR protection to improve country welfare.
Turning to the open-economy case, we now consider how cross-border interactions will aﬀect each
4There have been several studies examining the optimal combination of patent breadth and patent length when the
IPR regime features both forms of protection. For example, O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) study this in a
quality-improvement model with some dynamic considerations, but theirs is not a fully specified dynamic growth model.
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country’s inventive step policies and equilibrium research intensities. We allow for international trade
in goods, subject to the standard iceberg trade costs. Similarly, we allow for international patenting
by firms, whereby firms always have incentives to obtain a patent in each potential destination country
before they market there. We focus on the central case that domestic goods and foreign goods are
diﬀerentiated but highly substitutable with each other so as to contrast with earlier work of Grossman
and Lai (American Economic Review 2004), who analyzed international IPR issues under an alternative
regime based on patent length protection and product innovation. We examine a world with national
treatment in the granting of patents, so that countries do not discriminate across foreigners and award
patents by the same rules to both their own nationals and foreigners alike. We focus our attention on the
strategic interaction in the two-country case (for ease of tractability), when their governments set their
respective inventive step policies non-cooperatively. We show that there exists a stable Nash equilibrium
of this inventive step-setting game between national governments. Moreover, a formal analysis of the
welfare properties of this equilibrium confirms that it features over-protection of IPR, in the sense that
there is a scope for all countries to lower their inventive steps while achieving a Pareto improvement. This
result is in sharp contrast with that of Grossman and Lai (2004), who find that there is under-protection
of patent length in an expanding-varieties innovation model.
To understand the underlying intuition, it is important to grasp the nature of the cross-border ex-
ternalities from a country’s choice of inventive step. In this paper, the measure of varieties is fixed and
innovation takes place along the quality dimension, and the natural concept of IPR protection is the
inventive step. Firms from diﬀerent countries compete directly with each other by selling goods that are
highly substitutable with each other, and this direct competition gives rise to the negative cross-border
externality. When Country 1 raises its inventive step, B1, this raises incentive for Country 1’s firms to
invest in R&D and hence also the relative productivity position that Country 1 has in the diﬀerentiated
goods sector. On the other hand, it discourages Country 2’s firms from investing in R&D, as the prof-
itability of research in country 2 now diminishes as the relative productivity position of Country 2’s firms
falls – as a result of the trade barriers and high substitutability between goods developed by Country-1
and Country-2. Overall, the technological progress enjoyed by consumers in Country 2 actually slows
down, leading to lower welfare for their consumers. This is the source of the negative externality of
Country 1’s policy action on Country 2 welfare (Country 1 does not take this spillover into account when
deciding, B1). This underpins the over-protection result that we have derived regarding inventive step
policy.
Grossman and Lai (2004) on the other hand, consider product innovation that expands the existing
measure of varieties in the diﬀerentiated goods sector, in which the IPR protection instrument considered
is the duration of the patent protection of each new variety. As a result, an increase in Country 1’s
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patent length benefits both domestic and foreign firms by increasing the value of any global patent.
This induces more product innovation from firms in all countries, even in the presence of trade barriers.
The increased utility from the larger set of varieties that Country 2 can consume as well as increased
profits for Country-2 firms selling in Country 1 generate a positive cross-border externality from raising
Country 1’s patent length, and hence implies a tendency towards the under-provision of patent length
protection. Consequently, the conclusions with regards to whether patent protection is under- or over-
provided by country governments can be sensitive to the underlying structure of innovation process, the
patent instrument being considered, as well as the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.
Our present model also facilitates an analysis of the eﬀects of globalization (the reduction of distance
barriers) on patent policies.5 It turns out that, when domestic goods and foreign goods are diﬀerentiated
but highly substitutable with each other, the equilibrium inventive step of a country is larger when it
is open to trade and patenting by foreigners than when it is under autarky. In this sense, globalization
increases the incentive that each government has to increase its inventive step. Evidently, the onset of
globalization leads to a higher marginal benefit from raising inventive step protection relative to the
closed-economy benchmark. Intuitively, globalization leads to increased competition for Country 1 firms,
as they engage in direct competition with Country 2 firms. In this setting, a higher inventive step
increases the profitability of home firms for two reasons. First, domestic patent-holding firms enjoy a
longer average duration of monopoly profits, just like under autarky. Second, as the home inventive step
increases, home firms’ incentive to invest in R&D increases, while foreign firms’ incentive to invest in
R&D deceases. This in turn improves domestic firms’ productivity relative to foreign firms, thus allowing
domestic firms to compete more eﬀectively in the product market, increasing the profitability of research
in the home country. This latter eﬀect is naturally absent in the closed-economy setting, hence explaining
why inventive step protection confers a higher marginal benefit when countries can trade. Of note, this
result also stands in contrast to Grossman and Lai (2004).
The concept of required inventive step that we apply in this paper draws upon an extensive literature
on patenting in industrial organization. O’Donoghue (1998) models patent design in the context of
cumulative innovation comprising a long sequence of product improvements. He finds that a patentability
requirement can lead to an improvement in social welfare, namely that the benefit from a higher rate
of innovation can exceed the loss from conferring more monopoly power to firms. This is consistent
with our closed-economy result, although it is derived in a partial equilibrium setting.6 Green and
5Grossman and Lai (2004) did not explicitly consider the role of distance barriers, so that all newly-innovated varieties
are equally accessible by consumers in all markets.
6O’Donoghue (1998) also clarifies the distinction between a minimum patentable inventive step and a leading breadth
requirement. The former governs the need for a new invention to be suﬃciently novel before it can qualify for a patent.
The latter governs whether a new invention can be considered as infringing upon an existing patent, and hence whether the
inventor will need to pay royalty payments to the existing patent-holder.
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Scotchmer (1995) are among the first to model patent breadth in a quality-improvement innovation
setting. Similarly, Gallini (1992) proposed viewing the patent breadth as governing the cost of inventing
around the patent.7
Several existing papers have built on Kortum’s (1997) model of innovation to extend it to an open-
economy setting. Eaton and Kortum (1999) provides an alternative way to incorporate patenting in a
quality-based innovation model, where patenting reduces the hazard rate of imitation by potential com-
petitors. On a similar note, Eaton and Kortum (2006) explores issues related to the cross-border diﬀusion
of ideas, but in the absence of patenting constraints. Our contribution is instead to model the patenting
regime explicitly through a inventive step requirement that specifies the minimum quality improvement
needed for a new idea to be patentable and therefore to be marketed without being imitated.8 It is
also useful to clarify that while our model features quality-improving innovation, it is strictly speaking
not a full model of cumulative innovation along the lines of the quality-ladder models of Grossman and
Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). In those papers, successful innovation confers a positive
externality on future research eﬀort since this eﬀort is concentrated on ideas that would strictly improve
on the technology frontier. In contrast, our framework follows Kortum (1997) in that the ongoing search
process for future innovations can yield unsuccessful ideas that fall short of the patent frontier.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the innovation process based on Kortum (1997),
and derives the patent frontier distribution. Section 3 sets up the full model of patenting, growth and
trade. Section 4 analyzes the benchmark case of the closed-economy model. Section 5 tackles the
Nash equilibrium properties in the open-economy setting, focusing on the two-country symmetric case to
highlight the strategic interactions at play. Section 6 concludes. All detailed proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Innovation and the patent frontier
We first describe the innovation process, and show how this delivers a stochastic formulation of the
patent frontier. This will be a key building block when we spell out the full model in Section 3. We
derive the patent frontier in the closed-economy case, and then expand on this to develop useful results
for the multi-country case. Not surprisingly, the patent frontier distribution will depend on (among other
things) the inventive step B enacted by the country government.
7Note that our notion of required inventive step diﬀers from that in Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990),
who study patent breadth under horizontal diﬀerentiation of products, rather than innovation along a quality dimension.
8 In this light, the model of Kortum (1997), in which any research idea that advances the technological frontier is
automatically patented, is essentially the special closed-economy case in which B ≡ 1.
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2.1 The patent frontier in the closed economy
Consider a diﬀerentiated goods sector in which quality-based R&D takes place. There is a continuum of
varieties in this sector, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Since our focus is on innovation along the quality dimension,
we hold the measure of varieties constant at 1. Labor is the sole factor of production, and all production
technologies feature constant returns-to-scale. As a starting point, consider the closed-economy case. For
now, suppose that the prevailing wage in the country, w, is pinned down by conditions in the economy
that are exogenous from the perspective of this sector.
A defining feature of this diﬀerentiated goods sector is that productivity levels diﬀer across varieties.
Let zt(j) denote the productivity of the best patented idea for producing variety j at time t. Using
this best patented idea, 1/zt(j) is the labor input required to produce each unit of this variety, so that
the corresponding unit production cost is: ct(j) = w/zt(j). On the other hand, denote by z˜t(j) the
productivity of the best technologically-feasible idea for producing this variety at time t. Note that
zt(j) ≤ z˜t(j), as not all feasible technologies will be eligible for a patent. Given the stochastic features of
the innovation process which we shall specify below, for each j ∈ [0, 1], zt(j) and z˜t(j) will be realizations
of random variables, whose cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) we denote by F (z; t) and F˜ (z; t)
respectively.9 We refer to F (z; t) as the patent frontier distribution, and to F˜ (z; t) as the technology
frontier distribution.
Innovation: The innovation process that generates these technology and patent frontiers is based
on Kortum (1997) and Eaton and Kortum (2001). Innovation takes place along the quality dimension.
The actual innovation event itself is the outcome of a stochastic search process for ideas that potentially
improve upon the productivity of the current technologies. These ideas are generated by the research
sector in this economy. Specifically, each worker in the research sector obtains ideas at a Poisson arrival
rate α. These ideas represent productivity levels, q, drawn from a stationary search distribution, H(q).
The specific variety j to which each idea applies is determined by a random draw from the uniform
distribution on [0, 1], so that the varieties are symmetric from the perspective of the innovation process.10
Let Rt ≤ Lt be the number of workers employed in the research sector at time t, with Lt being the total
workforce of the country. (The remaining Lt−Rt workers are employed in production.) The cumulative
stock of ideas in the knowledge pool of the economy at time t is thus: T (t) = α
R t
0 Rsds, where we
initialize time at t = 0, with T (0) = 0.
To complete the description of the innovation process, we follow Kortum (1997) in specifying the
stationary search distribution to be the standard Pareto distribution: H(q) = 1 − q−θ, q ≥ 1.11 As is
9F (z; t) and F˜ (z; t) do not depend on j, since the varieties are ex ante symmetric.
10We rule out the possibility of directed search or innovation targeted towards specific goods, which would significantly
complicate the considerations involved.
11That this search distribution is fixed across time periods means that researchers may sample ideas that are below
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well-known, the Pareto search distribution gives rise to a technology frontier distribution across varieties
j ∈ [0, 1] which is Fréchet with cdf: F˜ (z; t) = exp
©
−T (t)z−θ
ª
.12 This distribution is characterized by
two key parameters: The scale parameter, T (t), governs the mean of the distribution, so that an economy
with a larger stock of ideas will on average feature a more productive technology frontier. On the other
hand, a larger shape parameter, θ, corresponds to a H(q) distribution with a lower variance, meaning
that researchers draw from a search distribution that places less weight on high productivity draws.13
For this reason, θ is also referred to as the inverse spread parameter, as it leads to a technology frontier
distribution with a thinner right-tail.
Patenting: We extend this treatment of the innovation process by incorporating IPR considerations
in the form of a inventive step requirement. As imitation costs of domestically sold goods are zero,
innovators with new ideas need to apply for a patent before the idea can be marketed without being
imitated. To improve the incentives for innovation, the patent authority or government protects existing
patent-holders by stipulating that a new idea can only be patented if it improves upon the productivity
of the current best patented idea by a minimum inventive step of B ≥ 1. Formally, if the current best
patented idea for variety j is of productivity z, a new patent will only be awarded if an idea of productivity
at least Bz is drawn.
We refer to B as the required inventive step of the country’s IPR regime. This inventive step require-
ment oﬀers protection to patent-holders in that one cannot obtain a new patent with a quality improve-
ment smaller than the required inventive step, as only ideas that exceed Bz in quality are awarded a new
patent. Thus, at any one time, for each variety j, there is (generically) one patent-holder who commands
the best available patent and the market for that variety. (We assume that there are no costs in applying
for and enforcing a patent, so that all innovators will patent their technology whenever and wherever it
qualifies for a patent.)
The stochastic arrival of ideas and the inventive step requirement jointly give rise to a patent frontier
distribution, F (z; t), across varieties j ∈ [0, 1]. Our first key result derives a parametric form for this
the current technological frontier, so that innovation is not truly cumulative in the sense of the quality-ladder models of
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Nevertheless, Kortum (1997) shows that parameterizing
the search distribution as Pareto gives rise to a steady state that features a constant rate of patenting in spite of a constant
positive growth rate in the research workforce, matching the US growth experience in the past half-century.
12See Eaton and Kortum (2001). This is derived by considering the probability that exactly k ideas with quality ≤ z are
drawn when the stock of ideas is T (t), and summing over all k ≥ 0:
F˜ (z; t) =
∞[
k=0
exp {−T (t)} (T (t))k
k! H(z)
k = exp {−T (t)}
∞[
k=0
(T (t)(1− z−θ))k
k! = exp
q
−T (t)z−θ
r
The above holds for z ≥ 1, which is the support of the Pareto search distribution. Kortum (1997) shows that this cdf
remains asymptotically valid for all z > 0, as the probability mass for 0 < z < 1 becomes infinitesimally small as the stock
of ideas grows large.
13The mean of logZ is 1θ (γ+logT (t)), which is increasing in T (t); γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. Also, the standard
deviation of logZ is π/(θ
s
(6)), which is decreasing in θ.
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patent frontier distribution:
Lemma 1: Suppose that T 0(t) is bounded. Then, as the stock of ideas grows arbitrarily large (T (t)→∞),
the patent frontier at time t across varieties j ∈ [0, 1] has a Fréchet distribution with cdf F (z; t) =
exp
n
−T (t) (Bz)−θ
o
, where B is the inventive step established by the country.
Proof. See the Appendix. Heuristically, the proof sets up a diﬀerential equation with respect to t for
F (z; t) that captures the evolution of the patent frontier over small time periods. Solving this diﬀerential
equation yields the above functional form for F (z; t). (This is similar to the solution strategy in Evenson
and Kislev (1976), Kortum (1997), and Alvarez et al. (2008).)
The patent frontier therefore belongs to the family of Fréchet distributions with the same shape
parameter as the technology frontier, but with a (weakly) smaller scale parameter, T (t)B−θ, since B ≥ 1.
Intuitively, the patent frontier features ideas that are on average less productive than those on the
technology frontier, as some ideas which are technologically feasible are not patented because they fail
to surpass the inventive step requirement. Of note, a larger inventive step (a higher B) tends to restrict
more ideas from being patented, and hence results in a patent frontier distribution with a lower mean
productivity.
2.2 The patent frontier in the open-economy
The above discussion demonstrates how one can introduce inventive step considerations into the quality-
improvement growth model of Kortum (1997), while retaining much of the convenience of the stochastic
formulation of innovation in that model. We now extend this discussion to a setting with N ≥ 1 countries.
When there is international trade, the diﬀerentiated goods sector in each country now has available a
larger set of varieties of goods than that available in a closed economy. In particular, firms in each
of the N countries are producers of their own unit measure of varieties ji ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, ...N , and
sell them to all countries in the world. In doing so, they compete with not only varieties produced by
firms in their own countries but also those produced by foreign firms. Instead of having varieties of
measure one available to them, consumers in each country now are faced with a wider choice of varieties
with a measure of N . The aggregate utility derived from the sets of varieties originated from diﬀerent
countries are diﬀerentiated technologically and utility-wise. In the central case we consider, they are
highly substitutable with each other.
Innovation: Production ideas emerge from the research sectors in all the N countries. The idea-
generating process within each country is similar: Each worker in the research sector obtains production
ideas with a Poisson arrival rate of αi, where i denotes the country. When an idea arrives, the specific
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variety j to which it applies is a random draw from a standard uniform distribution, while the quality
of the idea is drawn from the stationary Pareto search distribution, H(q) = 1 − q−θ, q ≥ 1. Letting
Rit denote the number of workers in country i employed in its research sector at time t, the current
cumulative stock of ideas generated by country i is then: Ti(t) = αi
R t
s=0Rsds. This innovation process
yields a technological frontier within each country, defined as the most productive idea obtained by that
country’s research sector. As we have seen, this technological frontier across varieties j is described by the
Fréchet cdf, exp{Ti(t)z−θ}, where the relevant scale parameter is the cumulative idea stock attributable
to country i. Our task moving forward is to understand how patenting aﬀects this innovation process.
Patenting: The open-economy model features a global market for ideas. Varieties originated from
diﬀerent countries are technologically and utility-wise diﬀerentiated from each other. They are therefore
treated as distinct varieties by all patent authorities. A producer seeking to market a diﬀerentiated
variety in a country can obtain a patent from that country’s patent authority (regardless of the country
of origin of the producer). IPR protection takes the form of an inventive step in each country: If the
existing best patented idea in country n for a particular variety is of productivity z, a new patent will
only be awarded if the quality of the new idea is at least Bnz, where Bn ≥ 1 is the required inventive
step established by country n’s patent board.
We adopt a setting in which international patenting is governed by the principles of non-discrimination
and national treatment. Each country therefore accords all ideas the same treatment under its patenting
regime, regardless of their country of origin. In particular, the same procedure for determining whether
an idea qualifies for a patent — namely, whether that idea exceeds the minimum inventive step of Bn — is
applied to innovations from all countries. Apart from the patenting requirement, we assume that there
are no other impediments to the global flow of ideas. In particular, there are no costs to obtaining a
patent in any country. This implies that producers will seek out and obtain a patent for their products
in every market where it is patentable. The imitation cost of a good that is sold locally is zero, but the
imitation cost of a good that is sold only in foreign countries is prohibitive, even if the technology has
been patented there.14 Goods from diﬀerent countries are diﬀerentiated and treated as technologically
distinct by patent authorities.
The following lemma states the distribution of the patent frontier in a country n fro varieties originated
from each source country i:
Lemma 2: Suppose that T 0i (t) is bounded for all countries i. Then, as the stock of ideas from each
country grows arbitrarily large (Ti(t) → ∞), under national treatment, the patent frontier in country
n at time t across varieties originated from country i ji ∈ [0, 1] has a Fréchet distribution with cdf:
14Specifically, the cost of imitating a technology of a good that is sold only in a foreign country (even if it is patented
there) and marketing it at home is higher than the expected profit from obtaining a new patent in the home country.
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exp
n
−Ti(t) (Bnz)−θ
o
, where Bn is the inventive step established by country n.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 1. Since there are no barriers to international patenting of ideas
in the open-economy, the result follows by replacing T (t) by Ti(t) and B by Bn in the closed-economy
patent frontier distribution from Lemma 1.
This is a close parallel of the expression for the patent frontier in the closed-economy case, being
from the same family of Fréchet distributions with shape parameter θ. Note that the scale parameter is
now Ti(t)B−θn , since the relevant stock of ideas is that which originates from country i only. Naturally,
the mean of this best patented idea distribution is increasing in the source country stock of ideas, and
decreasing in the inventive step in the recipient country.
3 Setting up the full model of innovation, patenting and trade
Having laid out the underlying innovation and patenting process, we proceed now to set up the full model.
Here, we build on the generality that the Eaton-Kortum framework aﬀords us to develop the model for
the N -country case (where N ≥ 1). The case of N = 1 corresponds to the closed-economy setting, which
will be analyzed in Section 4. We also focus on the two-country case in more detail in Section 5, in order
to derive more explicit results regarding inventive steps in the Nash equilibrium, although much of the
intuition here is applicable to the general N -country case.
3.1 The market for goods
Utility: There are two sectors in the world economy: (i) a homogeneous goods sector, and (ii) a
diﬀerentiated goods sector featuring N sets of continuum of varieties ji ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, 2, ...N where i
corresponds to country i. The preferences of the representative consumer in each country n ∈ {1, . . . ,N}
at time t are given by following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
Unt =
µ
ynt
η
¶η
·PN
i=1
³
exp{R 10 lnxnit(j)dj}´β¸ 1β
1− η


1−η
(1)
Here, i indexes the country of origin of the diﬀerentiated variety, while n denotes the country of consump-
tion. The elasticity of substitution that prevails between the consumption of varieties that originate from
diﬀerent countries is: φ = 1/(1−β), where 0 < β < 1. For each country, utility of varieties is aggregated,
with elasticity of substitution equal to 1. The aggregates of diﬀerentiated goods from diﬀerent countries
are imperfect substitutes of each other. Here, ynt denotes consumption of the homogenous good, and
xnit(j) denotes consumption of variety j of diﬀerentiated goods from country i. A constant share of
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income η ∈ (0, 1) is devoted to purchases of the homogenous good. In equilibrium, the expenditure on
varieties originated from country i is distributed equally among these varieties. The diﬀerentiated goods
sector consists of varieties from all N countries. The diﬀerentiated goods originated from each country
is as described in Section 2, and features innovation and patenting over time. On the other hand, there
is no technological progress in the homogenous goods sector; for this reason, we shall also refer to this
sector as the “traditional” sector, in the sense that no R&D eﬀort is channeled towards it.
Production and market structure: The traditional sector has a simple constant returns-to-scale
structure. In country n, production of this good uses an units of labor. Trade in this good encounters no
cross-border frictions, so its price is equalized across all countries and can be normalized to one. In what
follows, we shall focus on equilibria in which a positive quantity of this numeraire good is produced in
each country, so that the wage in country n is given by wn = 1/an, being pinned down by technological
conditions in this traditional sector.15 In practice, this means that the labor force Ln in each country,
as well as the consumer demand for homogenous goods (captured by η), must all be suﬃciently large, to
support such an equilibrium. (We shall make these parameter conditions more explicit when we explore
the two-country model in Section 5.)
Production in the diﬀerentiated goods sector likewise takes place under constant returns-to-scale.
In the multi-country world, however, countries will in general diﬀer in their productivity levels. These
underlying productivity diﬀerences generate a Ricardian basis for trade between countries, as varieties
can potentially be sourced from each of the N countries. However, the flow of goods across borders is
impeded by transport costs of the iceberg form: dni ≥ 1 units of a goods must be shipped out from
country i in order for one unit to arrive in country n.16 We make the standard assumptions that: (i)
dii = 1 for all i, so that there are no shipping costs within each country; and (ii) dni ≤ dnkdki for all
k 6= i, n, so that transhipment through a third-country port is not pursued.
Let z(1)nit(j) denote the productivity of the best idea originating from country i which has successfully
obtained a patent in country n at time t for variety ji. The marginal cost of production for this patent-
holder is: cnit = widni/znit(j), after taking the labor and shipping costs into account. To determine the
market outcome in country n, note that only producers who hold a country-n patent will participate
in that market in equilibrium. For each variety ji from country i, all producers from i who hold a
country-n patent for that variety engage in head-to-head Bertrand competition. The country i producer
who possesses the patented idea with the lowest marginal cost will thus command the entire country-n
market for variety ji, and limit-prices at the level of the patent-holder with the second-lowest marginal
15 It will turn out that when all countries have the same labor force growth rate, the steady state exhibits a constant wage
in each country that does not vary over time, so that we need not attach a time subscript to wn. The assumption of a
constant marginal product of labor is thus consistent with the long-run equilibrium of the model.
16We follow the convention in EK, where the second subscript denotes the exporting country, while the first subscript
refers to the importing country.
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cost. This rule ensures that all other country i patent-holders with less cost-eﬃcient ideas cannot earn
positive profits, and therefore leave the market to the lowest-cost patent-holder as the sole supplier.
We seek to evaluate the distribution of market prices for diﬀerentiated varieties, in order to later
derive an expression for welfare. Given the limit-pricing rule, it follows that we need to specify the
stochastic distribution that jointly describes both the best and second-best patented ideas that originate
from country i in country n. We have already seen in Lemma 2 that the distribution of this best patented
idea from i in n, denoted by the random variable Z(1)nit(j), is given by the Fréchet cdf: Pr(Z
(1)
nit(j) ≤ z) =
BPni(z; t) = exp
n
−Ti(t) (Bnz)−θ
o
, with Bn being the inventive step required by country n. Moving
forward, following Bernard et al. (2003), we specify the joint distribution of the best and second-best
patented ideas from country i in country n to be the multivariate analogue of the Fréchet distribution in
Lemma 2:
Pr(Z(1)nit ≤ z1, Z
(2)
nit ≤ z2) =
h
1 + Ti(t)
³
(B2nz2)
−θ − (Bnz1)−θ
´i
exp
n
−T (B2nz2)−θ
o
, 0 ≤ Bnz2 ≤ z1 (2)
Note that we require Bnz2 ≤ z1, since the best patented idea needs to satisfy the inventive step require-
ment vis-à-vis the second-best patented idea. Also, as Bnz2 → z1, (2) reduces to: Pr
³
Z(1)nit ≤ z1
´
=
exp
©
−Ti(t)(Bnz1)−θ
ª
, which is precisely the best patented idea distribution from Lemma 2.
Welfare: The joint productivity distribution for the best and second-best patented ideas from each
country given by (2) implies that the price of each variety ji originated from country i in country n, pnit(j),
can be viewed as a realization from a price distribution. Define Pnit = exp{
R 1
0 ln pnit(j)dj}. This is the
ideal price index of country i diﬀerentiated goods in country n. Then, solving the utility-maximization
problem based on (1), one can show that the demand xnit(j) for this variety by a country-n individual
who earns wage wn is:
xnit(j) =
(1− η)wnP 1−φnitPN
k=1 P
1−φ
nkt
1
pnit(j)
(3)
In particular, if φ > 1, then when Pnit increase, the demand level for each variety from country i in
country n will fall (holding pnit(j) constant).
Let’s now specialize to the two-country case. Define d as the iceberg trade cost between the two
countries. Based on the expression for the ideal price index in the closed-economy case derived in the
Appendix (setting N = 1), we have: Pnit = T
− 1θ
i widniB
2
nγ, where γ is a constant that does not depend
on Bn. In particular:
P11t = T
− 1θ
1t w1B
2
1γ
P12t = T
− 1θ
2t (w2d)B
2
1γ
P21t = T
− 1θ
1t (w1d)B
2
2γ
P22t = T
− 1θ
2t w2B
2
2γ (4)
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Based on (1), welfare (the real wage) is now given by:
Un =
wn³PN
i=1 P
1−φ
ni
´ 1−η
1−φ
(5)
The task of maximizing welfare thus boils down to the task of maximizing
³PN
i=1 P
1−φ
ni
´− 1
1−φ , ie mini-
mizing the price index. Using the expressions for the price indices, this reduces in the two-country case
to:
max
B1
B−21
µ
(T
− 1θ
1 w1)
1−φ + (T
− 1θ
2 w2d)
1−φ
¶− 1
1−φ
(6)
and
max
B2
B−22
µ
(T
− 1θ
1 w1d)
1−φ + (T
− 1θ
2 w2)
1−φ
¶− 1
1−φ
(7)
The above welfare expressions highlight the key tradeoﬀ involved in inventive step policy. On the one
hand, as we shall soon see below, a larger inventive step (a higher Bn) will raise research incentives in
all countries, and will hence increase the stock of ideas (each country’s Ti) in the aggregate. However,
this decreases consumer surplus, as a larger inventive step protects incumbent patent-holders for a longer
duration on average, by preventing a larger margin of lower-priced ideas from securing a patent. This
loss is captured by the B−2n term (n = 1, 2) in (6) and (7), which reflects the eﬀect of a higher Bn on
welfare holding the stock of ideas constant. The optimal patent policy will thus be the choice of Bn that
equates the marginal benefit of a larger idea stock against the marginal cost of the consumer surplus lost.
3.2 Research incentives and the country idea stocks
We turn now to the task of understanding this steady-state relationship between the inventive step policies
of the N countries and the country idea stocks. This is a key step towards characterizing the benefit
of raising IPR protection through a higher inventive step, and hence towards evaluating the optimal
inventive step. This requires us to consider the incentives faced by the research sector, specifically how
innovation activities are aﬀected when the inventive step is raised.
Markups and profits: Since innovation eﬀort is motivated by the expectation of a future flow
of profit returns, we compute the expected profits of diﬀerentiated varieties for firms in each country.
Recall that varieties originated from diﬀerent countries are technologically diﬀerentiated and are treated
as diﬀerent goods by the patent authorities. Therefore, only innovators from i who comes up with an
idea for variety ji ∈ [0, 1] will be considered for a patent in country n for variety ji. Let bnit(m) be the
probability that a given idea originating from country i undercuts the current best patented idea in n
from i by a factor of at least m, where m > 1. Then:
bnit(m) =
Z ∞
1
exp
(
−Ti(t)B−θn
µ
m
q
¶θ)
θq−θ−1dq ' 1
B−θn mθTi(t)
(8)
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where we have used the fact that the probability of the best patented idea in country n from country i
at time t being ≤ c is equal to: 1− exp
©
−Ti(t)B−θn cθ
ª
.17 The approximation taken in (8) is valid when
Ti(t)→∞.18
Observe in particular that the probability of a new idea from country i being eligible for a patent
in country n is: bnit(Bn) = 1Ti(t) . Not surprisingly, the larger the eﬀective stock of ideas available in
country i (a higher Ti(t)), the more diﬃcult it is for a new idea to secure a patent in country n. More
interestingly, this probability turns out to be independent of the inventive step, Bn. There are in fact two
countervailing eﬀects of an increase in Bn. First, given the current best patented idea from i in n, a larger
inventive step tends to reduce the probability that a new idea from i would qualify for a patent in n. On
the other hand, however, this would also lead to a patent frontier distribution of technologies from i in
n with a lower mean productivity level, since a larger margin of ideas which are technologically feasible
are not patented when Bn is high; this tends to raise the probability of an idea from i of successfully
qualifying for a patent in n. In our model, it turns out these two eﬀects oﬀset each other exactly, so
that Bn does not aﬀect the probability of a new idea from i obtaining a country-n patent, as asserted in
the introduction. As discussed in the Introduction, the inventive step set by a country thus aﬀects the
expected value of an idea only through its impact on the profits accruing to the innovator conditional
on successfully obtaining a patent in that country. On this last count, we know that a higher Bn tends
to raise flow profits, both because the successfully-patented idea would command a higher markup on
average, and because it makes it harder for competitor ideas to displace the patent-holder. A larger
inventive step therefore raises the overall incentive to innovate in our model.
The markup that a new patented idea from country i can command in country n is stochastically
determined, and is given by:
Pr [M ≤ m |M ≥ Bn] = bnit (Bn)− bnit (m)bnit (Bn) = 1−
µ
m
Bn
¶−θ
, m ≥ Bn (9)
This markup thus inherits a Pareto distribution; naturally, its support is defined only for m ≥ Bn, since
any newly-patented idea must by definition secure a markup of at least Bn vis-à-vis the second-best
patented idea. Of note, conditional on the idea surpassing the inventive step, the distribution of the
markup that the new idea commands does not depend on its country of origin.
We are now in a position to compute the profits that accrue to successful innovators.
Let Xnit be the total expenditure by country-n residents on diﬀerentiated goods originated from
country i. Let Πnit denote the profits earned by country i producers from sales in the country n market.
17Let Gni(c) denote the cost distribution for the best patented idea in country n from country i. Then Gni(c) =
1− exp

−TitB−θn cθ

.
18There is a discrepancy in that the stationary search distribution is defined for ideas q ≥ 1, whereas the patent frontier
distribution is defined for all z ≥ 0. Kortum (1997) shows that the probability mass for ideas with productivity between 0
and 1 can be ignored as Ti(t)→∞.
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Using the markup distribution (9), we have:
Πnit = Xnit
Z ∞
Bn
¡
1−m−1
¢
θm−θ−1Bθn dm =
Xnit
1 + θ
·
1 + θ
µ
Bn − 1
Bn
¶¸
(10)
Profits are therefore equal to the fraction 11+θ
h
1 + θ
³
Bn−1
Bn
´i
∈ (0, 1) of consumer expenditures on the
diﬀerentiated goods. Note the natural properties that a more protective patent regime (a higher Bn) and
a larger variance for the distribution of ideas (a smaller θ) both lead to a larger profit share.19
Using (3), (4) and (10), we can deduce that:
X11t
X12t
=
Π11t
Π12t
=
µ
P11t
P12t
¶1−φ
=
µ
T1
T2
¶φ−1
θ
µ
w2d
w1
¶φ−1
(11)
X21t
X22t
=
Π21t
Π22t
=
µ
P21t
P22t
¶1−φ
=
µ
T1
T2
¶φ−1
θ
µ
w2
w1d
¶φ−1
(12)
These expenditures and profits in the diﬀerentiated goods sector are further linked as a matter of
national income accounting. Specifically, consumption expenditure on all goods (including the numeraire
good) from all countries must be equal to the sum total of labor income in the production sector and
income earned from profits. In the two-country case, this means that:
X11t +X12t
1− η = (1− r1)w1L1t +Π11t +Π21t
X21t +X22t
1− η = (1− r2)w2L2t +Π12t +Π22t
Note that rit = Rit/Lit is the share of the labor force engaged in the research sector in country i at time
t, so that 1− rit is the relevant share of workers who earn the labor wage wi.
Define h(B) = 11−η
B(1+θ)
B(1+θ)−θ . Then, using (10), we can re-write the above equations as:
h(B1)(Π11t +Π12t) = (1− r1)w1L1t +Π11t +Π21t
h(B2)(Π21t +Π22t) = (1− r2)w2L2t +Π12t +Π22t (13)
Research incentives: To close the model fully, we need to specify how profits motivate innovation
activities. Let Vi denote the expected value of an idea that originates in country i. In equilibrium, the
expected value of such an idea multiplied by the arrival rate of ideas per worker needs to be equal to the
domestic wage: αiVit = wi, so that workers are indiﬀerent between engaging in production or research
activities. In turn, the expected value of an idea originated from country i, Vit, is the expected discounted
flow of future profits in each of the N potential consumer markets:
Vit = Pit
Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)
NX
n=1
bnit(Bn)× ΠnisPis
bnis(1)
bnit(Bn)
ds =
Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)
Pit
Pis
NX
n=1
Πnis
Bθn
Ti(s)
ds (14)
19 In the limiting case where Bn = 1, (10) implies a profit share of 1/(1 + θ), consistent with Eaton and Kortum (2001)’s
model without patenting.
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The term ΠnsPis captures the real profits earned in country n at time s; these are pre-multiplied by Pit
to express these profits in terms of time-t prices. Note also that bnis(1)bnit(Bn) is the probability that the
innovation continues to have the market to itself at time s > t, conditional on its having secured the
market at time t. (The numerator is bnis(1) since the incumbent patent-holder does not need to satisfy
the required inventive step constraint vis-à-vis new entering ideas.) For simplicity, all countries share the
same discount rate parameter ρ, where ρ satisfies: ρ > gLθ (1− η), to guarantee the existence of a steady
state where the country idea stocks are finite.
We evaluate Vit for a steady state in which: (i) the labor force grows in all countries at a constant
rate, gL (so that L˙i/Li = gL for all i), and (ii) the share of labor in the research sector is constant in
each country (so that rit = ri). Since Ti(t) = αi
R t
0 Risds, the time path of the stock of ideas is therefore
governed by: T˙i(t) = αiriLit. This implies that T/L converges to a constant value, αirigL , in the steady
state. The stock of ideas therefore grows at the same rate as the labor force: T˙ /T = L˙/L = gL. Now,
observe that the country price index derived in the Appendix is
µPN
i=1
³
T
− 1θ
i widniB
2
n exp
©
1−γ
θ
ª´1−φ¶ 1−η1−φ
.
This implies that: Pit/Pis = (Ti(t)/Ti(s))
−( 1−ηθ ) since idea stocks in all countries are growing at the same
rate gL in steady state. Therefore, Pit/Pis = exp
n³
1−η
θ
´
gL(s− t)
o
. Also, a quick inspection of (10)
and (13) implies that profits earned in each country market, Πnit, will grow in tandem with Li and Ti at
rate gL. In particular, this means that Πnit/Ti(t) is constant over time.
Using these properties, the expected value of an idea from country i from (14) can be expressed as:
Vit =
Z ∞
t
e−[ρ−
gL
θ (1−η)](s−t)
NX
n=1
Πnt
Bθn
Ti(t)
ds =
1£
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¤ NX
n=1
Πnt
Bθn
Ti(t)
Substituting this into the equilibrium condition αiVit = wi, we have, in the two country case:
Bθ1Π11 +B
θ
2Π21 =
w1T1
α1
³
ρ− gL
θ
(1− η)
´
(15)
Bθ1Π12 +B
θ
2Π22 =
w2T2
α2
³
ρ− gL
θ
(1− η)
´
(16)
This delivers a set of equations in (16) that capture how profits, Πnit, and the stock of ideas, Tit, must be
related in the steady state in which each country features a constant share of the workforce, ri ∈ (0, 1),
engaged in the research sector.
Moreover, we can now substitute the steady state expression for ri =
gL
αi
Tit
Lit back into the accounting
equations (13) that equate national expenditure to income. This yields, in the two-country case:
h(B1)(Π11t +Π12t) = w1L1t −
w1T1tgL
α1
+Π11t +Π21t (17)
h(B2)(Π21t +Π22t) = w2L2t −
w2T2tgL
α2
+Π12t +Π22t (18)
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3.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium in the two-country model is now fully-determined by the equations (11)-(12) and (15)-
(18), which represent a system of 6 equations in the 6 unknowns, Π11, Π12, Π21, Π22, T1, and T2 . The
profit levels, expenditure levels, and stock of ideas in the diﬀerentiated goods industry in each country
can be solved for as a function of the underlying conditions in the two countries, including the labor
force situation (Lit, wi, gL), the deep parameters of the model related to the innovation process (αi, θ),
preferences (η, ρ), distance barriers (d), as well as the country patent policies chosen by each country
government (the Bn’s).
Several remarks are worth highlighting. First, the share of labor eﬀort in the economy devoted towards
innovation activities is an endogenous outcome of this equilibrium, being equal to ri =
gL
αi
Tit
Lit . We shall
refer to ri as the research intensity of this country. Second, using a labor market-clearing condition, one
can show that the wages in each country, wi, are in fact constant in this steady state; the argument for
this is analogous to that in Eaton and Kortum (2001). Finally, the equilibrium of the model does feature
balanced trade: Countries that are net exporters of diﬀerentiated goods are in turn net importers of the
traditional good (and vice versa), so that the overall trade balance is zero for each country.
4 The closed-economy benchmark
We first study the closed-economy case of the model, which provides an important benchmark. This
allows us in particular to establish a baseline result on the existence of a non-trivial optimal inventive
step that improves country welfare. We will build on this result when we turn to the two-country model
with strategic interaction in Section 5.
4.1 Equilibrium
It is fairly straightforward to solve explicitly for the equilibrium in the closed-economy case. WhenN = 1,
(10) and (13) are a system of two equations in precisely two unknowns, Xt and Πt, which are respectively
the consumption expenditures and profits for the diﬀerentiated goods sector in the sole country. (We
drop the country subscript for convenience.) Solving these two equations simultaneously yields:
Xt =
"
B (1 + θ)
η
1−ηB (1 + θ) + θ
#
(1− rt)wtLt (19)
Πt =
"
B (1 + θ)− θ
η
1−ηB (1 + θ) + θ
#
(1− rt)wtLt (20)
Based on (19) and (20), one can show that for a given country income level, wtLt, and for a given
research intensity, rt, both consumption and profits in this diﬀerentiated goods sector will increase if: (i)
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the country’s inventive step, B, is raised; or (ii) the stationary search distribution of ideas has a larger
spread (1/θ is higher). Naturally, both Xt and Πt fall as the share of income spent on the numeraire
good, η, rises.
From the closed-economy analogue of (16), the steady-state stock of ideas for this country is therefore:
T (t) =
αLt
gL
· B
θ [B (1 + θ)− θ]
Bθ [B (1 + θ)− θ] +
h
ρ
gL −
1−η
θ
i h
η
1−ηB (1 + θ) + θ
i (21)
where we have used the expression for Πt from (20). Observe that the larger the labor force, Lt, the
greater the stock of ideas the economy is able to generate in equilibrium, by virtue of being able to devote
more workers to the research sector. It is moreover straightforward to diﬀerentiate (21) and verify that
T (t) is in fact increasing in B. Thus, a more stringent inventive step requirement indeed expands the
stock of research ideas accessible to the economy.
Since T/L = αrgL in steady state, the share of the labor force employed in the research sector is:
r =
Bθ [B (1 + θ)− θ]
Bθ [B (1 + θ)− θ] +
³
ρ
gL −
1−η
θ
´ h
η
1−ηB (1 + θ) + θ
i (22)
Note that r ∈ (0, 1), so long as ρ−
¡gL
θ
¢
(1−η) > 0. Importantly, the equilibrium value of r also increases
with the inventive step. Intuitively, as B increases, if we hold r (and hence also T ) constant, this will
increase the value of a patent Vt. This is evident by re-writing (15) in the closed-economy case:
Vt =
1£
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¤ΠtBθTt
With a higher B, the per-period profits Πt increase as we saw from (20); this happens because the
more stringent inventive step requirement raises the expected markup which existing patent-holders can
charge. Moreover, the Bθ term also increases, which reflects the fact that the higher B enables the
incumbent patent-holder to retain the market for a longer expected duration. (Recall from (8) that
bs(1) = B
θ
Ts is equal to the probability that an idea secures a patent at date t and continues to hold the
market at date s > t.) An increase in B therefore tends to raise the value of a patent through these two
channels. However, we know that Vt must stay constant in steady-state, as dictated by the labor market
equilibrium condition, αVt = w. Thus, workers move out of production into the R&D sector in response
to the higher inventive step, so that r and T both rise endogenously; in turn, the expanded stock of ideas
lowers the expected duration over which the patent-holder can command the market, which provides the
countervailing force that keeps Vt constant in equilibrium.
4.2 Optimal patent policy
We now analyze the standpoint of a government that seeks to maximize consumer welfare through its
choice of patent policy instrument. The closed-economy analogue for welfare can be obtained from the
19
expression for the real wage in (5) by setting N = 1 and wn = w. Simplifying, we have:
w
P
= γ0wη
³
T
1
θB−2
´1−η
(23)
where we have suppressed the time argument for notational simplicity. (In steady state, maximizing the
present discounted flow of real wages over time is equivalent to maximizing the per period real wage.)
Since γ0 and w are constants, the optimal inventive step needs to equate the marginal benefit of an
increase in B to the economy (as captured by an increase in T ) with the marginal cost from paying
higher prices for goods that are under patent protection (as captured by a decrease in the term B−2).
Substituting in the expression for the steady-state stock of ideas from (21), and ignoring various
constants that do not aﬀect the maximization outcome, one can show that the optimal inventive step
policy is given by:
B∗ = argmax
B
B−2θ
"
1 +
µ
ρ
gL
− 1− η
θ
¶ η
1−ηB (1 + θ) + θ
Bθ[B(1 + θ)− θ]
#−1
(24)
subject to B ≥ 1
Solving this maximization problem delivers the first key result of this paper, which addresses the
scope for inventive step protection to improve outcomes in the closed-economy setting:
Proposition 1 [Optimal Patent Policy in the Closed Economy ] If ρgL −
1−η
θ > 2, the optimal
policy calls for a binding inventive step, B∗ > 1. This optimal inventive step, B∗, is moreover unique.
Otherwise, for 0 < ρgL −
1−η
θ ≤ 2, the optimal policy is B∗ = 1.
The above proposition is in line with a set of results from the endogenous growth literature on how
there can be under-investment in innovation activities in the laissez-faire equilibrium in such models
(Aghion and Howitt 1992, Grossman and Helpman 1991). In our model, it is useful to inspect the
condition ρgL −
1−η
θ > 2, to obtain some intuition for understanding when such under-investment is more
likely. Research activities are more likely to be ineﬃciently low from a social planner’s perspective when:
(i) ρ is large, so that consumers weigh the short-term consumer surplus loss heavily, leading to a low
incentive to undertake R&D; (ii) gL is small, so that the stock of ideas does not advance suﬃciently
fast in steady state ( T˙T is small); (iii) 1− η is small, namely when expenditure on diﬀerentiated varieties
and hence the profit motive for innovation in this sector are both small; and (iv) 1/θ is small, so that
the right-tail of the stationary search distribution for ideas is thinner, hence lowering the likelihood of
obtaining a very high productivity innovation.
It should moreover be stressed that this condition is readily satisfied by standard parameter values.
For example, consider ρ = 0.05 and gL = 0.02, which imply an annual discount factor of about 0.95
and a 2% labor force growth rate respectively. Eaton and Kortum (2002) oﬀer a range of estimates for
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θ from fitting their model of trade to the OECD data, of which θ = 8.28 is a commonly-used central
value. Taken together, we have: ρgL −
1−η
θ >
ρ
gL −
1
θ = 2.38 > 2. If we further identify the diﬀerentiated
goods sector with manufacturing industries, then 1 − η is the share of income spent by consumers on
manufactured goods, which in Eaton and Kortum (2002) is calibrated to equal 0.13. The relatively small
value of this parameter makes it even easier to satisfy the desired condition for an interior solution to
the welfare maximization problem. In short, there is good reason to believe that a binding inventive step
will indeed be the optimal policy for a wide range of relevant parameterizations.
5 Nash equilibrium analysis for the two-country case
We turn next to a detailed analysis of the open-economy model. This will allow us to expand the
discussion into issues relating to the cross-border externalities from national inventive step policies, and
the eﬀect of globalization on the domestic research intensity and the overall incentive to extend inventive
step protection.
5.1 Solving for the equilibrium
While specifying the equilibrium is conceptually straightforward, this being described in Section 3.3,
solving explicitly for closed-form expressions is algebraically complicated for the general N -country case.
For the sake of tractability, we will therefore focus most of our attention on the two-country case. This
will allow us to derive some sharp results concerning the policy game between the two countries in terms
of how strongly each chooses to protect inventive step. It will moreover facilitate a more direct comparison
with the benchmark results in Grossman and Lai (2004) regarding optimal patent length policy in their
two-country setting.
Suppose that there are only two countries, i = 1, 2, in the global economy. From (11) and (12), define:
K1 =
µ
T1
T2
¶1−φ
θ
µ
w2d
w1
¶1−φ
K2 =
µ
T1
T2
¶φ−1
θ
µ
w2
w1d
¶φ−1
Then, we have that Π12 = K1Π11, and Π21 = K2Π22. (Moreover, observe that K1K2 = d2(1−φ).)
Substitute Π12 = K1Π11, and Π21 = K2Π22 into (15) and (16). This gives a system of two equations
in two unknowns, Π11 and Π22. The solution to this system is:
Π11 =
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
1− d2(1−φ)
1
Bθ1
µ
T1w1
α1
−K2
T2w2
α2
¶
(25)
Π22 =
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
1− d2(1−φ)
1
Bθ2
µ
T2w2
α2
−K1
T1w1
α1
¶
(26)
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First, substitute Π12 = K1Π11, and Π21 = K2Π22 into (17) and (18). Then, substitute the expressions
for Π11 and Π22 into (17) and (18). Finally, using the fact that ri =
gL
αi
Ti
Li , we get the following two
equations in the two unknowns T1 and T2.
[h(B1)(1 +K1)− 1]
1
Bθ1
·
1−K2
T2
T1
w2/α2
w1/α1
¸
−K2
1
Bθ2
T2
T1
w2/α2
w1/α1
+ d2(1−φ)
1
Bθ2
=
µ
α1L1
T1
− gL
¶
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
(27)
[h(B2)(1 +K2)− 1]
1
Bθ2
·
1−K1
T1
T2
w1/α1
w2/α2
¸
−K1
1
Bθ1
T1
T2
w1/α1
w2/α2
+ d2(1−φ)
1
Bθ1
=
µ
α2L2
T2
− gL
¶
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
(28)
Note the symmetry in the two equations. Now, observe from the definition ofK1 thatK1 is decreasing
in T1/T2 when φ > 1. On the other hand, K2 T2T1 is increasing in T1/T2 when φ > 1 + θ. Also, K2 is
increasing in T1/T2 when φ > 1, while K1 T1T2 is decreasing in T1/T2 when φ > 1 + θ.
In order to determine the sign of Tˆ1 and Tˆ2, we need to totally diﬀerentiate the system of equations
in (27) and (28) with respect to B1. To simplify the notation, let us define the following:
A11 ≡ [h(B1)(1 +K1)− 1]
1
Bθ1
·
1−K2
T2
T1
w2/α2
w1/α1
¸
A12 ≡ −K2
1
Bθ2
T2
T1
w2/α2
w1/α1
A13 ≡ d2(1−φ)
1
Bθ2
A21 ≡ [h(B2)(1 +K2)− 1]
1
Bθ2
·
1−K1
T1
T2
w1/α1
w2/α2
¸
A22 ≡ −K1
1
Bθ1
T1
T2
w1/α1
w2/α2
A23 ≡ d2(1−φ)
1
Bθ1
Note that A11, A12, and A13 are respectively the first, second and third summands on the left-hand
side of (27), while A21, A22, and A23 are the corresponding summands in (28). We focus our attention on
equilibria in which diﬀerentiated products firms earn positive profits from their sales in both countries.
From (25) and (26), we require that 1 − K2 T2T1
w2/α2
w1/α1 > 0 and 1 − K1
T1
T2
w1/α1
w2/α2 > 0 in such equilibria.
Moreover, note that K1,K2 ≥ 0, and that h(B1), h(B2) > 1 for all B > 1. It follows that A11, A21 ≥ 0,
A12, A22 ≤ 0, and A13, A23 ≥ 0.
Define Tˆi ≡ 1Ti
dTi
dB1 . To facilitate the diﬀerentiation with respect to B1, observe that:
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dK1
dB1
= K1
1− φ
θ
(Tˆ1 − Tˆ2)
dK2
dB1
= K2
φ− 1
θ
(Tˆ1 − Tˆ2)
d
³
K1 T1T2
´
dB1
= K1
T1
T2
1− φ+ θ
θ
(Tˆ1 − Tˆ2)
d
³
K2 T2T1
´
dB1
= K2
T2
T1
φ− θ − 1
θ
(Tˆ1 − Tˆ2)
Using these expressions, we can now totally diﬀerentiate (27) and (28) with respect to B1. This yields

A11

 h(B1)K1
h(B1)(1 +K1)− 1
1− φ
θ
+
K2 T2T1
w2/α2
w1/α1
1−K2 T2T1
w2/α2
w1/α1
1− φ+ θ
θ

−A12
1− φ+ θ
θ

 (Tˆ1 − Tˆ2)
+
α1L1
T1
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
Tˆ1
= −A11
µ
h0(B1)(1 +K1)
h(B1)(1 +K1)− 1
− θ
B1
¶
(29)
and

A21

 h(B2)K2
h(B2)(1 +K2)− 1
φ− 1
θ
+
K1 T1T2
w1/α1
w2/α2
1−K1 T1T2
w1/α1
w2/α2
φ− θ − 1
θ

−A22
φ− θ − 1
θ

 (Tˆ1 − Tˆ2)
+
α2L2
T2
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
Tˆ2
= (A22 +A23)
θ
B1
(30)
For notational ease, let us define:
D1 ≡ A11

 h(B1)K1
h(B1)(1 +K1)− 1
φ− 1
θ
+
K2 T2T1
w2/α2
w1/α1
1−K2 T2T1
w2/α2
w1/α1
φ− θ − 1
θ

−A12
φ− θ − 1
θ
,
D2 ≡ A21

 h(B2)K2
h(B2)(1 +K2)− 1
φ− 1
θ
+
K1 T1T2
w1/α1
w2/α2
1−K1 T1T2
w1/α1
w2/α2
φ− θ − 1
θ

−A22
φ− θ − 1
θ
.
Thus, D1 is the negative of the coeﬃcient of Tˆ1 − Tˆ2 in (29), and D2 is the coeﬃcient of Tˆ1 − Tˆ2
in (30). Let us consider a case where the diﬀerentiated varieties from the two countries are suﬃciently
strong substitutes. In particular, assume that: φ > 1+ θ. This would imply that D1,D2 ≥ 0 (bearing in
mind that A11, A21 ≥ 0 and A12, A22 ≤ 0).
A slight rearrangement of (29) and (30) yields:
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·
α1L1
T1
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
−D1
¸
Tˆ1 +D1Tˆ2 = −A11
µ
h0(B1)(1 +K1)
h(B1)(1 +K1)− 1
− θ
B1
¶
(31)
D2Tˆ1 +
·
α2L2
T2
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
−D2
¸
Tˆ2 = (A22 +A23)
θ
B1
(32)
which is a system of linear simultaneous equations in Tˆ1 and Tˆ2. Using Cramer’s Rule, it follows that:
Tˆ1 =
de−bf
ad−bc and Tˆ2 =
af−ce
ad−bc , where:
de− bf = −A11
µ
h0(B1)(1 +K1)
h(B1)(1 +K1)− 1
− θ
B1
¶·
α2L2
T2
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
−D2
¸
−D1 (A22 +A23)
θ
B1
af − ce = (A22 +A23)
θ
B1
·
α1L1
T1
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
−D1
¸
+A11
µ
h0(B1)(1 +K1)
h(B1)(1 +K1)− 1
− θ
B1
¶
D2
ad− bc =
·
α1L1
T1
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
−D1
¸ ·
α2L2
T2
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
−D2
¸
−D1D2
For tractability, from now on, we shall assume symmetry, i.e. w1 = w2 = w, α1 = α2 = α, L1 = L2 =
L, B1 = B2 = B, d > 1. Therefore, T1 = T2 = T . It will be seen that the results we derive in the rest of
the paper do seem to be robust to generalization to the asymmetric cases.
In the appendix, it is shown that a suﬃcient condition for Tˆ2 < 0 is
θBθ
h(B)
·
h(B)− 1
Bθ
+
gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸
>
2d1−φ
1− d2(1−φ)
h
2 (φ− 1)− θ
³
1 + d1−φ
´i
(33)
For any given B, θ, η, ρ, and gL, it can be easily shown that this holds when φ is suﬃciently large, or
d is suﬃciently large. The fact that bT1 + bT2 > 0 and bT1 > bT2 means that bT2 < 0 implies that bT1 > 0.
Therefore, the following lemma establishes how the country stock of ideas responds to inventive step
policy:
Lemma 3: Consider equilibria of the two-country model in which both countries produce a positive
amount of output in both the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods sectors. Then, ∂Ti∂Bi > 0 and
∂Tj
∂Bi < 0,
where i ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j as long as φ is suﬃciently large or d is suﬃciently large.
Proof: See the Appendix for the derivation of (33) and an analysis of its property.
Thus, an increase in the inventive step raises the domestic stock of ideas, so that ceteris paribus this
patent instrument does indeed have its presumed intended eﬀect of promoting innovations. On the other
hand, the model features a negative cross-border eﬀect, in that a higher inventive step lowers the stock of
ideas in the foreign country. Intuitively, an increase in B1 promotes domestic innovation and raises the
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average productivity of domestic firms in the diﬀerentiated goods sector. This erodes the profitability of
R&D for foreign firms in this sector, leading to a shift of labor out of the foreign diﬀerentiated goods
sector into the traditional good sector there. Therefore, the research intensity and hence the stock of
ideas falls in the foreign country.
To address the issue of welfare, refer to equation (6). To facilitate exposition, define
Ψi ≡
µ
(T
− 1θ
i wi)
1−φ + (T
− 1θ
j wjd)
1−φ
¶− 1
1−φ
where i 6= j. Diﬀerentiating (6) with respect to B1, we
get:
θ
d lnB−21 Ψ1
dB1
=
−2θ
B1
+
(T
− 1θ
1 w1)
1−φTˆ1 + (T
− 1θ
2 w2d)
1−φTˆ2
(T
− 1θ
1 w1)
1−φ + (T
− 1θ
2 w2d)
1−φ
Treating the inventive step as a policy instrument, what then is the nature of the tradeoﬀ facing each
country in deciding on its optimal patent policy? Without loss of generality, let us illustrate this for
country 1 based on (6). A more active patenting regime corresponding to a higher B1 should in principle
raise the aggregate stock of ideas available, hence providing a boost to consumption in country 1. This
benefit is reflected in the Ψ1 term in (6) for country 1 welfare, although it is not a priori obvious from
the algebraic expression how this will vary with B1. Since an increase in B1 would raise T1, but lower T2,
so the net eﬀect on Ψ1 needs to be formally worked out from the above equation. Assuming symmetry
as before, we get
θ
d lnB−21 Ψ1
dB1
=
−2θ
B1
+
d1−φTˆ2 + Tˆ1
d1−φ + 1
(34)
It is clear that sgn
³
dΨ1
dB1
´
= sgn
³
d1−φTˆ2 + Tˆ1
´
. Since bT1 + bT2 > 0 and bT1 > bT2, it is clear that
d1−φTˆ2 + Tˆ1 > 0. Therefore, we have the following:
Lemma 4: Consider equilibria of the two-country model in which both countries produce a positive
amount of output in both the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods sectors. We have: ∂Ψi∂Bi > 0, where
i ∈ {1, 2}.
Thus, it is indeed the case that an increase in B1 would raise Ψ1 and thus confer a net benefit to country
1’s consumers. In particular, the increase in the domestic stock of ideas T1 outweighs the negative eﬀect
on T2, intuitively because the eﬀect of T2 on Ψ1 is more muted due to the distance barrier, d.
On the cost side however, ideas that improve on the current best patented idea by a factor smaller
than B1 are not eligible for a patent and hence cannot enter the market, so that consumers have to
pay a higher price for these particular varieties even though a more productive technology has become
feasible. The higher is B1, the larger the consumer surplus loss due to the protection that the inventive
step aﬀords to existing patent holders. This cost of patent protection is captured by the B−21 term in (6).
From the perspective of country 1, the optimal patent policy choice thus entails trading oﬀ the benefit
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of more innovation against this short-term consumer surplus loss.20
Incidentally, it is straightforward to verify as a consistency check that as d→∞, (5) simplify to the
expression for welfare in the closed-economy case, namely (23). In other words, the cross-border spillover
of ideas vanishes if goods cannot be traded due to a prohibitive transport cost, and so welfare would
simply be given by the closed-economy expression with the domestic country stock of ideas.
5.2 Nash equilibrium analysis
Having derived the country welfare expressions, we are now ready to tackle the question of how inventive
step policies are determined. Following Grossman and Lai (2004), we model this policy question as
a one-shot non-cooperative game, with B1 and B2 chosen simultaneously by the respective country
governments.
We assume that each country government seeks to maximize their respective country’s welfare (they
are national welfare-maximizers), but that they do not internalize the spillover eﬀects which their policy
choice has on the foreign country. More formally, given the current choice of inventive step protection
being exercised by Country 2, the Country 1 government would do best by choosing: B∗1 = argmaxB1
B−21 Ψ1. This delivers Country 1’s best-response function (BRF), which expresses B
∗
1 as a function of B2.
Likewise, given B1, Country 2’s BRF is given by solving B∗2 = argmaxB2
B−22 Ψ2. The Nash Equilibrium
outcome is then determined as a point of intersection of the two best-response functions.
At first glance, this view of how inventive steps are set may seem at odds with the observation that de
jure patent laws are rarely changed in practice. Nevertheless, we take B1 and B2 in our model to reflect
the actual de facto implementation of these formal laws, namely how stringently patent laws are applied.
The degree of this enforcement clearly varies more substantially across countries and across time, and is
plausibly more responsive to the policy choices made by a country’s trading partners.
To obtain the BRF for Country 1 (BRF1), we calculate
∂ ln(B−21 Ψ1)
∂B1 given B2, and set this partial
derivative to zero. This computation lead to the following equation for BRF1:
−2θ
B1
+
(T
− 1θ
1 w1)
1−φTˆ1 + (T
− 1θ
2 w2d)
1−φTˆ2
(T
− 1θ
1 w1)
1−φ + (T
− 1θ
2 w2d)
1−φ
= 0 (35)
In particular, the marginal benefit term is a weighted average of Tˆ1 and Tˆ2, namely a weighted average
of the percentage change in the idea stocks in each country. Likewise, solving for ∂ ln(B
−2
2 Ψ2)
∂B2 = 0 yields
the BRF for Country 2 (BRF2):
−2θ
B2
+
(T
− 1θ
2 w2)
1−φTˆ 02 + (T
− 1θ
1 w1d)
1−φTˆ 01
(T
− 1θ
2 w2)
1−φ + (T
− 1θ
1 w1d)
1−φ
= 0 (36)
20 It should also be clear that the problem of maximizing the present discounted flow of real wages will boil down to
choosing B1 to maximize the per-period flow welfare given by (6).
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where Tˆ 0i ≡ 1Ti
dTi
dB2 .
Focusing first on BRF1, we show in the Appendix that, under symmetry, for a given level of B2,
the expression in the curly brackets on the left-hand side of (35) is in fact a monotonically decreasing
function of B1, so that the value of B1 that maximizes Country 1 welfare is in fact unique. Given
the underlying symmetry between (35) and (36), it follows that for each given level of B1, there is a
unique B∗2 that maximizes welfare in Country 2. In short, the BRFs for both countries are well-defined
functions, and the Nash Equilibrium inventive steps are determined by the intersection point of the two
BRFs in B1-B2 space. We have found through extensive numerical simulations that B1 and B2 are
typically strategic complements, in the sense that both BRFs tend to be upward-sloping functions when
B1, B2 ≥ 1. Moreover, for a wide range of standard parameterizations, we have found that there is a
unique, stable Nash equilibrium to the inventive step-setting game. (We have found no examples to the
contrary, and it is our conjecture that this can be proven formally.)
A central question in this line of research concerns the eﬃciency of the patent policies that countries
adopt in the strategic equilibrium. A key result in Grossman and Lai (2004) is that the Nash equilibrium
in their patent policy game features under-protection of patent lengths, in the sense that a Pareto
improvement can be achieved if both countries could jointly coordinate to raise their patent length
protection. This results rests on the existence of a net positive cross-border externality as a country
extends its patent length: This raises the incentives to innovate in the foreign country, but this benefit
is not fully internalized in the setting of the domestic patent length. What then is the nature of the
cross-border externality in our context, where the nature of innovation and the instrument of patent
protection is markedly diﬀerent? To tackle this question, we need to understand the nature of the cross-
border externality present in our model. Observe from (7) that Country 1’s choice of inventive step B1
aﬀects the welfare of Country 2 through the term Ψ2, namely through its eﬀect on the stock of ideas that
Country 2 eﬀectively consumes. In fact, it can be shown that
θ
d lnB−22 Ψ2
dB1
=
(T
− 1θ
1 w1d)
1−φTˆ1 + (T
− 1θ
2 w2)
1−φTˆ2
(T
− 1θ
1 w1d)
1−φ + (T
− 1θ
2 w2)
1−φ
=
d1−φTˆ1 + Tˆ2
d1−φ + 1
under symmetry
Therefore, there is negative (positive) externality when d1−φTˆ1+ Tˆ2 is less (greater) than zero. In the
appendix, it is shown that a suﬃcient condition for d1−φTˆ1 + Tˆ2 < 0 is
1
1− d1−φ
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
>
θBθ
h(B)
·
h(B)− 1
Bθ
+
gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸
>
2d1−φ
1− d2(1−φ)
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
(37)
In fact, it can be shown that the expression on the left hand side increases with φ, while the one on
the right hand side has a hump-shaped relationship with φ as well as decreases with d. The expression on
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the right hand side tends to zero as φ gets large, whereas the expression on the left hand side increases
without bound with φ. This is shown in Figure 1. It can be seen that for any given B, θ, η, ρ, gL, the
above set of inequalities (37) holds when d or φ is suﬃciently large.21
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Therefore, we have:
Proposition 2 [Negative externality of inventive step protection] Consider equilibria of the
two-country model in which both countries produce a positive amount of output in both the homogeneous
and diﬀerentiated goods sectors. We have: ∂Uj∂Bi < 0, where i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i as long as φ or d is
suﬃciently large .
Thus, an increase in Country 1’s inventive step tends to lower Ψ2 when φ is suﬃciently large and
hence lower welfare in Country 2. In other words, we in fact have a negative cross-border spillover of
Country 1’s inventive step policy on Country 2 , and vice versa when foreign and domestic goods are
highly substitutable with each other. In the Appendix, we show that it is possible to find conditions
under which positive externality occurs, as Figure 1 indicates.22
Now we turn to the highly policy-relevant issue of whether there is global over- or under-protection
of IPR protection in Nash equilibrium. To answer this question, we show below that under symmetry
the Nash equilibrium inventive step is greater than the globally optimal one for any given d as long as
there is negative cross-border externality of raising the inventive step requirement.
First, define
Tˆ 0i ≡
1
Ti
dTi
dB2
Due to symmetry, to calculate the globally optimal B, we only need to focus on maximizing B−21 Ψ1
by choosing B, bearing in mind that (1) both B1 and B2 change as B changes, (2) dB1 = dB2, and (3)
each of B1 and B2 aﬀects T1 as well as T2. Therefore, to obtain the globally optimal B under symmetry,
we need to solve
dB−21 Ψ1
dB1
+
dB−21 Ψ1
dB2
= 0
and then set B1 = B2 = B. Note that
dB−21 Ψ1
dB2 and
dB−22 Ψ2
dB1 are mirror images of each other. Therefore,
the above equation is equivalent to
B1
θ

−2θ
B1
+
(T
− 1θ
1 w1)
1−φTˆ1 + (T
− 1θ
2 w2d)
1−φTˆ2
(T
− 1θ
1 w1)
1−φ + (T
− 1θ
2 w2d)
1−φ

+ B2
θ

(T
− 1θ
2 w2d)
1−φTˆ 02 + (T
− 1θ
1 w1)
1−φTˆ 01
(T
− 1θ
2 w2d)
1−φ + (T
− 1θ
1 w1)
1−φ

 = 0
21To be more exact, there is negative externality when d is suﬃciently large so that case (a) shown in Figure 1 occurs,
and φ is suﬃciently large so that the externality falls into the negative range indicated in case (a).
22 It is shown in the Appendix that a positive cross-border externality occurs when d and φ are intermediate in values.
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Symmetry of the two countries implies that Tˆ1 = Tˆ 02 and Tˆ2 = Tˆ 01. So, we have
B
θ
"
−2θ
B
+
(T−
1
θw)1−φ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢
Tˆ1 + (T−
1
θwd)1−φ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢
Tˆ2
(T−
1
θw)1−φ (1 + d1−φ)
#
= 0
⇔ −2θ
B
+ Tˆ1 + Tˆ2 = 0
On the other hand, the condition that determines the Nash equilibrium B under symmetry is obtained
by setting the expression in (34) to zero, which becomes
−2θ
B
+
Tˆ1 + d1−φTˆ2
1 + d1−φ
= 0
Now, it can be easily shown that
Tˆ1 + d1−φTˆ2
1 + d1−φ
> Tˆ1 + Tˆ2 for any given d > 1
⇐⇒
Tˆ2 + d1−φTˆ1 < 0 for any given d
which is true iﬀ there is negative cross-border externality, as shown in (??).
Therefore, Nash B > globally optimal B for any given d iﬀ there is negative cross-border externality
from raising B. ¥
Therefore, we have
Proposition 3 [Global over-provision of inventive step requirement in equilibrium] Under
symmetry, when φ or d is suﬃciently large, and suppose that both countries set strictly binding inventive
steps in Nash Equilibrium (B∗1 , B
∗
2 > 1 where B
∗
1 = B
∗
2 = B
∗). There is over-provision of inventive
step requirement in Nash Equilibrium, in that there exist B∗∗1 and B
∗∗
2 (where B
∗∗
1 = B
∗∗
2 = B
∗∗) with
1 < B∗∗ < B∗, such that welfare in both countries will increase if their inventive step policies are lowered
to B∗∗.
We illustrate this finding in Figure 2, which highlights the contrast between our result and Grossman
and Lai (2004). In Figure 2a, we sketch the BRFs in our present model for the typical case in which
the BRFs are upward-sloping (inventive steps are strategic complements). Given the negative nature
of the eﬀect of a higher B1 on Country 2’s welfare, the iso-welfare curves along BRF2 correspond to
higher levels of welfare as we move in a leftward direction (the direction of decreasing B1). Similarly, the
iso-welfare curves along BRF1 reflect increased levels of welfare as we move downward (in the direction of
decreasing B2). The shaded area to the southwest of the Nash equilibrium thus corresponds to a region
of stronger inventive step protection in both countries that nevertheless leads to a Pareto improvement
in welfare. In short, there is over-provision of inventive step protection in Nash equilibrium. This stands
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in contrast with the situation in Grossman and Lai (2004), which is shown in Figure 2b. There, patent
length policies are in fact strategic substitutes in the central case they consider, hence the downward-
sloping best-response functions.23 Here, as the patent length policy in Country 1, Ω1, increases, welfare
in Country 2 also increases, reflecting the positive cross-border externality. The direction of increasing
welfare for the Country 2 iso-welfare curves is thus to the right (the direction of higher Ω1). An analogous
argument applies for Country 1’s iso-welfare curves. Taken together, there is a region to the northeast
of the Nash equilibrium that illustrates combinations of patent length policies that would yield Pareto
superior outcomes, so that the Nash equilibrium features under-protection of patent lengths instead.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The contrast between Proposition 3 and the conclusions in Grossman and Lai (2004) have an intuitive
explanation that hinges on the diﬀerences in the nature of innovation in the two papers. In this paper, the
measure of varieties from each country is fixed and innovation takes place along the quality dimension,
and the natural concept of IPR protection is the inventive step. Firms from diﬀerent countries compete
directly with each other by selling goods that are highly substitutable with each other, and this direct
competition gives rise to the negative cross-border externality. When Country 1 raises its inventive step,
B1, this raises T1 and hence also the relative productivity position that Country 1 has in the diﬀerentiated
goods sector. As domestic and foreign goods are highly substitutable, and Country-2 firms competes at an
disadvantage in Country-1 market (due to trade barriers), the profitability of R&D for firms in Country 2
falls, leading to a decrease in T2. Overall, consumers in Country 1 gain because Ψ1 increases overall; the
increase in T1 outweighs the eﬀect of the fall in T2, as consumers can only access Country 2 technologies
after paying an iceberg transport cost d. Conversely, for Country 2, the eﬀect of T2 falling dominates the
increase in T1 for much the same reason, and Ψ2 falls, generating a negative externality of Country 1’s
policy action on Country 2 welfare (Country 1 does not take this spillover into account when deciding
B1). This underpins the over-protection result that we have derive inventive step policy.
Grossman and Lai (2004) on the other hand, consider product innovation that expands the existing
measure of varieties in the diﬀerentiated goods sector, in which the IPR protection instrument considered
is the duration of the patent protection of each new variety. As a result, an increase in Ω1 (Country
1’s patent length) benefits both domestic and foreign firms by increasing the value of any global patent.
This induces more product innovation from firms in all countries, even in the presence of trade barriers.
The increased utility from the larger set of varieties that Country 2 can consume as well as increased
profits for Country-2 firms selling in Country 1 generate a positive cross-border externality from raising
23 It is stated in Grossman and Lai (2004) that the patent lengths can be strategic complements too for some values of
β in their model (where the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor in R&D is 1/(1 − β). But those
cases are considered to be rarer.
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Ω1, and hence implies a tendency towards the under-provision of patent length protection.
In sum, the verdict with regards to whether there is over- or under-protection of IPR in Nash equi-
librium of the patent-setting game hinges on the sign of the cross-border externality that the patent
instrument generates. In the model which we have presented above, the sign of this spillover is negative,
in contrast with Grossman and Lai (2004), because goods from diﬀerent countries are highly substitutable
with each other and an increase in home inventive step disproportionately favors the competitiveness of
home firms versus foreign firms because of the existence of trade barriers. Consequently, the conclusions
with regards to whether patent protection is under- or over-provided by country governments can be
sensitive to the underlying structure of innovation process and the patent instrument being considered.
We turn next to the key question of how globalization aﬀects research intensity in each country.
The can be two approaches to answering this question. First, we can assume that countries respond to
globalization by changing their patent protection policies in response to it. Within the context of our
model, this boils down to a question of how d aﬀects the equilibrium inventive steps, which would in turn
aﬀect research intensities. The second approach will be based on the assumption that countries do not
adjust their required inventive steps as globalization deepens, perhaps because history and institutional
inertia create hurdles for governments to change their patent laws. Under such circumstances, what
would be the eﬀect of globalization on research intensities of countries? To analyze this case, we have
to assume that B1 and B2 are exogenous and determine the eﬀects of a decrease in d on T1 and T2. We
shall start with the second approach, as it is very simple to analyze.
(27) and (16) imply that under symmetry
h(B)− 1
Bθ
=
αL
T − gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
for any given d (38)
This implies that globalization (decrease in d) does not aﬀect research intensities in both countries if
B1 = B2 = B are exogenous given. Therefore, we have
Proposition 4 [Eﬀect of globalization when inventive steps are exogenous] Given that coun-
tries set the same exogenous inventive steps, the research intensities of all countries remain unchanged
as distance barriers are lowered.
What is the intuition for this result? As Eaton and Kortum (2001) point out, there are two eﬀects
on the incentive to allocate resource to R&D as d decreases: 1. an increase in profitability from R&D
as the increased access to the foreign market increases profit opportunities; 2. a decrease in profitability
from R&D as there is increased competition from foreign firms in the home market. Each of these eﬀects
increases with the required inventive step of the market in question. When B1 = B2, the two eﬀects are
equal.
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Note that equation (38) holds for d =∞, which is the closed economy. Therefore, the globally optimal
B for any d is the same as the optimal B in a closed economy. Since we have proved previously that
when φ or d is suﬃciently large the Nash B > globally optimal B for any given d, it must be true that
Nash B (∞ > d > 1) > closed economy optimal B = Nash B (d = ∞). Consequently, the equilibrium
inventive steps chosen in the open-economy setting will be strictly higher than that chosen in autarky.
We record this finding in:
Proposition 5 [Eﬀect of globalization when inventive steps are endogenous] The equilibrium
inventive step of a country is larger when it is open to trade and patenting by foreigners than when it is
under autarky when φ or d is suﬃciently large.
This result merits some discussion. Observe first that the −2θB1 term on the left-hand side of (35)
comes from the log-derivative of the B−21 term in the real wage, and hence represents the marginal cost
to Country 1 of raising its inventive step. On the other hand, the remaining summand on the left-hand
side of (35) correspond to the marginal benefit of raising B1, namely from the increase in the stock of
ideas, Ψ1, accessible to Country 1’s consumers. These marginal cost and marginal benefit functions are
illustrated in Figure 1 for a given value of B2; both curves are downward-sloping, but the marginal benefit
function descends more steeply and cuts the marginal cost curve from above.24
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Evidently, the onset of globalization leads to a higher marginal benefit from raising inventive step
protection relative to the closed-economy benchmark. Intuitively, when domestic goods and foreign
goods are highly substitutable with each other, globalization leads to increased competition for Country
1 firms, as they engage in direct competition with Country 2 firms . In this setting, a higher inventive
step encourages domestic innovation at the expense of that in the foreign country (T1 increases, while T2
decreases), improving domestic firms’ productivity relative to foreign firms, and thus allowing domestic
firms to compete more eﬀectively in the product market. This eﬀect is naturally absent in the closed-
economy setting, hence explaining why inventive step protection confers a higher marginal benefit when
countries can trade. (Refer to Figure 1 again)
Of note, this result also stands in contrast to Grossman and Lai (2004). In their Proposition 1, they
find that globalization actually leads to a decreased propensity to extend patent length protection, the
intuition being that patent policy in an open-economy setting is less eﬀective at stimulating innovation
as firms earn part of their profits in overseas markets where the patent protection extended in their
24To see this, note that after factoring out θB1 , the marginal cost component is a constant (−2). On the other hand, the
marginal benefit component remains a decreasing function of B1; this follows from the proof that the expression in the curly
brackets on the left-hand side of (35) is monotonically decreasing in B1.
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home countries does not apply. Therefore, the marginal benefit of extending patent length is lower in an
open economy than in autarky. Moreover, the marginal cost of extending patent length is higher in an
open economy than in autarky, as a fraction of goods consumed is imported, and an increase in patent
length benefits foreign firms instead of home firms. It appears therefore that inventive step protection
in quality-improvement innovation in the presence of direct competition between domestic and foreign
goods that are highly substitutable in our open-economy model in fact raises the marginal benefit of
patent protection without changing the marginal cost, leading to the converse result that the incentives
to protect inventive steps are higher in the open-economy.
6 Conclusion
In the patent protection literature, it is widely recognized that patent length protection leads to a
tradeoﬀ between the dynamic gains from induced innovation and static losses from the increased duration
of monopoly power of the patent-holders. Grossman and Lai (2004) conducted an analysis of a multi-
country patent-length-setting game, based on a model of on-going product innovation. One of their major
findings is that there are positive cross-border externalities from extending patent length protection. This
implies that there is global under-protection of IPR, and that there is room for international coordination
in patent policy to improve global welfare by increasing the strength of global patent protection. This
is because an increase in patent length protection for new products benefits both domestic and foreign
firms even with the presence of trade barriers. As firms do not invest in R&D so as to improve their
productivity, there is no sense in which an increase in patent length hurt the competitiveness of foreign
firms. Thus, there are positive cross-border externalities from extending patent length.
In the present paper, we find that if one considers required inventive step (or non-obviousness) as the
instrument of patent protection in quality-improvement innovation (which we can call process innova-
tion), there can be negative cross-border externalities from increaseing the strength of patent protection if
domestic and foreign goods are suﬃciently substitutable with each other. This means that there is global
over-protection of IPR and international coordination should aim at decreasing global IPR protection.
This is because an increase in inventive step requirement at home disproportionately increases the prof-
itability of quality-improvement R&D at home vis-a-vis that of foreign firms, due the existence of trade
barriers. High substitutability between home and foreign goods exacerbate this disadvantage of foreign
firms, lowering the profitability their R&D activities and slowing their technological progress. Meanwhile,
the existence of trade barriers limits the gains of foreign consumers from productivity improvement in
the home country. This is the cause of the negative cross-border externalities.
Consequently, the conclusions with regard to whether patent protection is under- or over-provided
by country governments can be sensitive to the underlying structure of innovation process, the patent
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instrument being considered, as well as the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.
Interestingly, the existence of negative externalities in our model also leads to the conclusion that
globalization leads to an increase in the Nash equilibrium inventive steps and higher equilibrium research
intensities in all countries.
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8 Appendix: Details of Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: [Patent Frontier in the Closed Economy]
Proof. The objective is to obtain an expression for F (z; t), the time-t distribution of the patent frontier. Consider
a short window of time between t and t+  (with  small) during which the patent oﬃce is open and ideas can be
patented. Let Z∆t be a random variable denoting the most productive idea that arrives between time t and t+ .
During this short time period, the stock of ideas increases by ∆T (t) = T (t+ )− T (t). Thus:
Pr(Z∆t < z) =
∞X
k=0
exp {−∆T (t)} (∆T (t))k
k!
H(z)k = exp {−∆T (t)}
∞X
k=0
(∆T (t)(1− z−θ))k
k!
= exp
©
−∆T (t)z−θ
ª
(39)
(To obtain this last expression, we sum over the probability that exactly k ideas ≤ z arrive between time t and
t+ , these being drawn from the incremental stock of ideas ∆T (t), where k ranges from 0 to ∞.)
We write down an expression for F (z; t+ ) in terms of F (z; t). The probability that the patent frontier is ≤ z
at time t +  is the union of two events: (i) all ideas that arrive between t and t +  do not surpass the required
inventive step, and the patent frontier at time t is itself already ≤ z, and (ii) the best idea that arrives between t
and t+  surpasses the required inventive step, and this new best idea is itself ≤ z. Note that only the best idea
that arrives during this short time period of length  will be considered for a patent.
Let PFt be the random variable denoting the quality of the idea at the patent frontier at time t. We have:
F (z; t+ ) =
Z z
ζ=0
Pr(Z∆t < Bζ|PFt = ζ) dPr(PFt ≤ ζ) +
Z z/B
ζ=0
Pr(Bζ ≤ Z∆t < z|PFt = ζ) dPr(PFt ≤ ζ)
The first summand captures the probability of event (i): Conditioning on the current value of the patent frontier
(PFt = ζ), we evaluate the probability that the best idea that arrives does not exceed Bζ. The integral sign
aggregates this probability over the possible values of ζ ∈ [0, z], these being consistent with PFt+ being ≤ z. The
second summand captures event (ii): Conditioning once again on the value of the time-t patent frontier, we work
out the probability that the best idea that arrives surpasses the required inventive step but nevertheless remains
≤ z. (The upper limit of the integral is z/B, to ensure that there are ideas which surpasses the required inventive
step, but nevertheless remain ≤ z.)
Substituting in the cdf for Z∆t from (39), and simplifying, we get:
F (z; t+ ) =
Z z
ζ=0
exp{−∆T (t)(Bζ)−θ} dPr(PFt ≤ ζ)
+
Z z/B
ζ=0
¡
exp{−∆T (t)z−θ}− exp{−∆T (t)(Bζ)−θ}¢ dPr(PFt ≤ ζ)
=
Z z/B
ζ=0
exp{−∆T (t)z−θ} dF (ζ; t) +
Z z
ζ=z/B
exp{−∆T (t)(Bζ)−θ} dF (ζ; t)
= exp{−∆T (t)z−θ}F (z/B; t) +
Z z
ζ=z/B
exp{−∆T (t)(Bζ)−θ} dF (ζ; t)
= exp{−∆T (t)(Bz)−θ}F (z; t)−
Z z
ζ=z/B
θ∆T (t)B−θζ−θ−1 exp{−∆T (t)(Bζ)−θ}F (ζ; t) dζ
where the last step follows from integrating by parts.
Now, substitute the above expression for F (z; t + ) into ∂F (z;t)∂t = lim→0
1
 [F (z; t+ )− F (z; t)], and apply
L’Hospital’s Rule. One obtains:
∂ F (z; t)
∂t
= −T 0(t)(Bz)−θF (z; t)−
Z z
ζ=z/B
T 0(t)θB−θζ−θ−1F (ζ; t) dζ
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=⇒ logF (z; t) =
Z t
s=0
"
−T 0(s)(Bz)−θ −
Z z
ζ=z/B
T 0(s)θB−θζ−θ−1
F (ζ; s)
F (z; s)
dζ
#
ds
= −T (t)(Bz)−θ −
Z t
s=0
T 0(s)
Z z
ζ=z/B
θB−θζ−θ−1
F (ζ; s)
F (z; s)
dz ds
=⇒ F (z; t) = exp
©
−T (t)(Bz)−θ
ª× exp(Z t
s=0
−T 0(s)
Z z
ζ=z/B
θB−θζ−θ−1
F (ζ; s)
F (z; s)
dζ ds
)
(40)
Note that we adopt the normalization, T (0) = 0 (the stock of ideas is zero in the initial time period).
Since the integrand in (40) is non-positive, it follows that F (z; t) ≤ exp
©
−T (t)(Bz)−θ
ª
. Together with the
assumption that T 0(t) is bounded with |T 0(t)| ≤ k, we have:Z z
ζ=z/B
T 0(t)θB−θζ−θ−1F (ζ; t) dζ ≤
Z z
ζ=z/B
T 0(t)θB−θζ−θ−1 exp
©
−T (t)(Bζ)−θ
ª
dζ
≤ k
"
exp
©
−T (t)(Bζ)−θ
ª
T (t)
#z
ζ=z/B
=
k
T (t)
¡
exp
©
−T (t)(Bz)−θ
ª
− exp
©
−T (t)(z)−θ
ª¢
→ 0 as T (t)→ +∞
Hence, as the stock of ideas grows large, the second term in the product on the right-hand side of (40) tends to 1.
The patent frontier distribution thus tends asymptotically to the Fréchet cdf: F (z; t) = exp
©
−T (t)(Bz)−θ
ª
. This
distribution applies to each variety j ∈ [0, 1], since varieties are ex ante identical.
Proof of Lemma 2: [Best Patented Idea from each Country]
Proof. We present a short proof below. An alternative proof derived from first principles in a manner similar to
Lemma 1 above is available on request.
Recall that Bn is the inventive step in country n. Country n awards country-specific patents, namely where it
has a separate patenting system for ideas originating from each country. Let CSPni(t) denote the country-specific
patent frontier for ideas from country i in country n at time t. Thus, an idea from country i receives this country-
specific patent so long as it is more productive than the previous best idea holding a country-i specific patent by
an inventive step of Bn.
Moreover, applying Lemma 1, as Ti(t)→ +∞ for all countries i, we have:
Pr (CSPni(t) ≤ z) = exp{−Ti(t)(Bnz)−θ}. (41)
Derivation of the Price Index and Welfare Expressions:
Proof Recall that in the open-economy model, the price index for the diﬀerentiated goods sector in country
n is given by:
³PN
i=1 P
1−φ
ni
´ 1
1−φ
, where Pni is the ideal price index for varieties originating from country i. We
thus need to compute Pni, the derivation of which follows closely that in the Mathematical Appendix to Bernard
et al. (2003).
Consider a new idea originating from country i. (Without loss of generality, suppose this new idea is for some
variety j ∈ [0, 1].) This new idea needs to surpasses the minimum inventive step requirement of Bn in order to
qualify for a patent in country n. Specifically, this means that the new idea needs to improve on the existing
best idea from country i for variety j which holds a patent in country n by an inventive step of at least Bn.
Note in particular that if this new idea satisfies this inventive step requirement, it would automatically secure the
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market for that country-i variety in country n: If the current best patented idea from country i in country n for
that variety is z, then the current market price for that variety would be widni/z. A new idea that satisfies the
minimum inventive step would have a market price of at most widni/Bnz, which is ≤ widni/z. Hence, a new idea
that is patentable would automatically be competitive and secure the country-n market for that variety.
Let C(1)ni and C
(2)
ni be the unit production costs corresponding to the best and second-best patented ideas
respectively originating from country i in country n. These costs are random variables across varieties j from
country i’s diﬀerentiated goods sector. (We suppress the time subscripts for ease of notation.) Using the joint
distribution for the productivity of these two best ideas from (2), we have:
Gcni(c1, c2) = Pr(C
(1)
ni ≥ c1, C
(2)
ni ≥ c2)
= Pr
µ
Z(1)ni ≤
widni
c1
, Z(2)ni ≤
widni
c2
¶
=
n
1 + Ti[(B2nwidni)
−θcθ2 − (Bnwidni)
−θ cθ1]
o
exp{−Ti(B2nwidni)−θcθ2}, 0 ≤ c1 ≤
c2
Bn
From this, the joint distribution of the lowest and second lowest costs corresponding to ideas from country i
that have been patented in country n, which we denote by Gni(c1, c2), is:
Gni(c1, c2) = Pr(C
(1)
ni ≤ c1, C
(2)
ni ≤ c2)
= 1− Pr(C(1)ni ≥ c1, C
(2)
ni ≥ c1)− Pr(C
(1)
ni ≥ 0, C
(2)
ni ≥ c2) + Pr(C
(1)
ni ≥ c1, C
(2)
ni ≥ c2)
= 1− (1 + Ti(widni)−θ(B−2θn −B−θn )cθ1) exp
©
−Ti(widni)−θB−2θn cθ1
ª
. . .
−Ti(widni)−θB−θn cθ1 exp
©
−Ti(widni)−θB−2θn cθ2
ª
Since the firm with the best patented idea sets a price equal to the marginal cost of the second-best patented idea
(limit-pricing), the prevailing market price for country i varieties in country n will be governed by the distribution
of C(2)ni :
Pr
³
C(2)ni ≤ c2
´
= Pr
³
C(1)ni ≤ c2, C
(2)
ni ≤ c2
´
= 1− exp
©
−Ti(widni)−θB−2θn cθ2
ª
− Ti(widni)−θB−2θn cθ2 exp
©
−Ti(widni)−θB−2θn cθ2
ª
The probability distribution function (pdf) of the market price pni(j) for variety j from country i in country
n is thus given by:
g2 (pni) =
∂
∂pni
£
1− exp
©
−Ti(widni)−θB−2θn pθni
ª
− Ti(widni)−θB−2θn pθni exp
©
−Ti(widni)−θB−2θn pθni
ª¤
= θp2θ−1ni T
2
i (widni)
−2θB−4θn exp
©
−Ti(widni)−θB−2θn pθni
ª
The ideal price index for diﬀerentiated varieties from country i in country n is therefore:
exp
½Z 1
0
ln pni(j) dj
¾
= exp
½Z ∞
0
(ln p)g2(p) dp
¾
= exp
½Z ∞
0
(ln p)θp2θ−1ni T
2
i (widni)
−2θB−4θn exp
©
−Ti(widni)−θB−2θn pθni
ª
dp
¾
= exp
½Z ∞
0
·
1
θ
lnx + ln
³
T
− 1θ
i widniB
2
n
´¸
· x exp {−x} dx
¾
where we have performed the change of variables, x = Ti(widni)−θB−2θn p
θ, to get to this last step.
It is straightforward first to show through integration by parts that:
R∞
0
ln
³
T
− 1θ
i widniB
2
n
´
x exp {−x} dx =
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ln
³
T
− 1θ
i widniB
2
n
´
. As for
R∞
0
1
θ (lnx)x exp {−x} dx, perform the change of variables, y = − lnx:Z ∞
0
1
θ
(lnx)x exp {−x} dx = 1
θ
Z ∞
−∞
− exp {−y} exp {− exp {−y}} y exp {−y} dy
= −1
θ
[exp {− exp {−y}} y exp {−y}]∞−∞
+
1
θ
Z ∞
−∞
exp {− exp {−y}} [exp {−y}− y exp {−y}] dy
=
1
θ
Z ∞
−∞
exp {− exp {−y}} [exp {−y}− y exp {−y}] dy
=
1
θ
[exp {− exp {−y}}]∞−∞ −
1
θ
Z ∞
−∞
y exp {−y} exp {− exp {−y}} dy
=
1
θ
− 1
θ
Z ∞
−∞
y exp {−y} exp {− exp {−y}} dy
But
R∞
−∞ y exp {−y} exp {− exp {−y}} dy is the mean of the Gumbel distribution (with pdf: exp {− exp {−y}} dy).
This is precisely equal to γ, the Euler-Mascheroni constant. So,
R∞
0
1
θ (lnx)x exp {−x} dx = 1−γθ . The ideal price
index, Pni = exp
nR 1
0
ln p(j)ni dj
o
is thus equal to T
− 1θ
i widniB
2
n exp
©
1−γ
θ
ª
.
The diﬀerentiated goods sector price index for country n is thus:
µPN
i=1
³
T
− 1θ
i widniB
2
n exp
©
1−γ
θ
ª´1−φ¶ 11−φ
,
which is equal to: B2n
µPN
i=1
³
T
− 1θ
i widni
´1−φ¶ 11−φ
up to a multiplicative constant. In particular, for the two-
country case which we consider in Section 5 of the paper, this price index is equal to:
B21
µ³
T
− 1θ
1 w1
´1−φ
+
³
T
− 1θ
2 w2d
´1−φ¶ 11−φ
for country 1; and equal to: B22
µ³
T
− 1θ
2 w2
´1−φ
+
³
T
− 1θ
1 w1d
´1−φ¶ 11−φ
for country 2. The corresponding welfare expressions (the real wage) for country 1 and 2 respectively are:
w1B
−2(1−η)
1
µ³
T
− 1θ
1 w1
´1−φ
+
³
T
− 1θ
2 w2d
´1−φ¶− 1−η1−φ
and w2B
−2(1−η)
2
µ³
T
− 1θ
2 w2
´1−φ
+
³
T
− 1θ
1 w1d
´1−φ¶− 1−η1−φ
.
Proof of Proposition 1: [Optimal inventive step in the Closed Economy]
Proof. Log-diﬀerentiating (24), one obtains the following first-order condition:
−2 +
¡
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¢ (B(1+θ)2−θ2)( η1−ηB+1)+ η1−ηB
Bθ[B(1+θ)−θ]2
gL +
¡
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¢ ( η1−η )B(1+θ)+θ
Bθ[B(1+θ)−θ]
= 0
Note that the denominator of the fraction on the left-hand side is positive, since: (i) (1 + θ)B − θ > 0, as
B ≥ 1 > θ/(1 + θ); and (ii) ρgL −
1−η
θ > 0. Upon further simplification, the first-order condition is equivalent to:
−2Bθ [B(1 + θ)− θ]2 +
µ
ρ
gL
− 1− η
θ
¶·
− η
1− ηB
2(1 + θ)2 +
η
1− ηB(1 + θ)
2 +B(1− θ2) + θ2
¸
= 0
Let Γ denote the expression on the left-hand side of the above equation. We have: Diﬀerentiating this with
respect to B yields:
dΓ
dB
= −2Bθ−1 (B(1 + θ)− θ) [θ (B(1 + θ)− θ) + 2B(1 + θ)]
+
µ
ρ
gL
− 1− η
θ
¶·
η
1− η (1− 2B)(1 + θ)
2 + (1− θ2)
¸
< 0
for all B ≥ 1 and θ > 1.
40
Observe that: (i) Γ < 0 as B →∞; and (ii) Γ = −2 +
³
ρ
gL −
1−η
θ
´
when B = 1. Since dΓdB < 0 for all B > 1,
the intermediate value theorem implies that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a solution to the first-order
condition to exist is: ρgL −
1−η
θ > 2. When this holds, the graph of Γ as a function of B starts out at a positive
value at B = 1 and declines monotonically, eventually taking on a negative value for B suﬃciently big. There
thus exists a unique B∗ > 1 that satisfies the first-order condition. Moreover, sign(Γ) > 0 for 1 ≥ B < B∗ and
sign(Γ) < 0 for B > B∗, which means that the slope of the original objective function is positive for 1 ≥ B < B∗
and negative for B > B∗. In other words, the turning point at B∗ is indeed a maxima.
On the other hand, when 0 < ρgL −
1−η
θ < 2, the Γ function always takes on a negative value, which means that
original objective function is decreasing for all B ≥ 1. The maximum is therefore achieved at a corner solution,
B∗ = 1.
Proof that there in negative cross-border externality when φ is suﬃciently large and
positive externality when φ and d are intermediate in value (or, externality would never be positive when d is
large)
Proof We can be easily show that under symmetry
K1 = d1−φ
K2 = d1−φ
A11 =
£
h(B)
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢
− 1
¤ ¡
1− d1−φ
¢
Bθ
> 0
A12 = −
d1−φ
Bθ
< 0
A13 =
d2(1−φ)
Bθ
> 0
A21 = A11
A22 = A12
A23 = A13
D1 =
d1−φh(B)
θBθ
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
> 0 given φ > θ + 1
D2 = D1 = D
Referring to (27) and (28), it can be easily shown that under symmetry
h(B)− 1
Bθ
=
αL
T − gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
for all d
⇒ αL
T
£
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¤ = h(B)− 1
Bθ
+
gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
for all d
This equation will be useful below.
Recall that there is negative (positive) externality when d1−φTˆ1 + Tˆ2 is less (greater) than zero.
1. Negative externality
A suﬃcient condition for negative externality (i.e. d1−φTˆ1 + Tˆ2 < 0) is ad − bc > 0 and (af − ce)+
(de− bf) d1−φ < 0
A suﬃcient condition for ad− bc > 0, af − ce < 0 and de− bf > 0 is
αL
T
·
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸
−D > D
which is equivalent to ·
h(B)− 1
Bθ
+
gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸³
1− d2(1−φ)
´
>
2d1−φh(B)
θBθ
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
(42)
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Given that αLT
h
1−d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1−η)
i
− D > D , a suﬃcient condition for |af−ce|d1−φ > de − bf (so as to get negative
externality) is
D
d1−φ
>
αL
T
·
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸
−D
which is equivalent to ¡
1 + d1−φ
¢
h(B)
θBθ
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
>
·
h(B)− 1
Bθ
+
gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸³
1− d2(1−φ)
´
(43)
Combining (42) and (43), we have
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢
h(B)
θBθ
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
>
·
h(B)− 1
Bθ
+
gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸³
1− d2(1−φ)
´
>
2d1−φh(B)
θBθ
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
(44)
which is equivalent to (37):
1
1− d1−φ
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
>
θBθ
h(B)
·
h(B)− 1
Bθ
+
gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸
>
2d1−φ
1− d2(1−φ)
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
The above condition (44) together with φ > θ + 1 would guarantee that
1. ad− bc > 0
2. de− bf > 0
3. af − ce < 0
4. |af−ce|d1−φ > de− bf
5. and therefore, an increase in B1 leads to a decrease in U2 – there is negative cross-border externality from
increasing the inventive step requirement at home.
The eﬀect of φ on the LHS of (37) is always positive for all φ, since the eﬀects of φ− 1 and φ− θ− 1 are going
to dominate that of 1+d
1−φ
1−d1−φ . Proof:
∂
∂φ
"
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢
1− d1−φ
#
=
¡
1− d1−φ
¢2
+ 1− d2(1−φ) − 2d2(1−φ) (φ− θ − 1) ln d
(1− d1−φ)2
(45)
Note that the above expression is positive for all 1 < φ ≤ θ + 1. Now, taking derivative of the numerator,
∂
∂φ
h¡
1− d1−φ
¢2
+ 1− d2(1−φ) − 2d1−φ (φ− θ − 1) ln d
i
= ln d
h
2d2(1−φ) + 4d2(1−φ) (φ− θ − 1) (ln d)− 2d2(1−φ) + 2
¡
1− d1−φ
¢
d1−φ
i
= ln d
h
4d2(1−φ) (φ− θ − 1) (ln d) + 2
¡
1− d1−φ
¢
d1−φ
i
> 0 for φ ≥ θ + 1
We conclude that
∂
∂φ
"
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢
1− d1−φ
#
> 0 for all φ > 1
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Moreover, the value of
2(φ−1)−θ(1+d1−φ)
1−d1−φ ranges from 0 to infinity as φ increases from small to large. Hence, for a
given d, we can always find a φ∗ such that when φ > φ∗ condition (44) is satisfied. The graph of this expression
as a function of φ is shown in Figure 1.
2. Positive externality
A suﬃcient condition for positive externality (i.e. d1−φTˆ1 + Tˆ2 > 0) is ad − bc < 0 and (af − ce)+
(de− bf) d1−φ < 0.
The suﬃcient conditions for ad− bc < 0 and af − ce < 0 are
αL
T
·
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸
−D < D
and
αL
T
·
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸
−D > 0
These two conditions together is equivalent to
0 <
αL
T
h
1−d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1−η)
i
−D
D
< 1 (46)
As Tˆ1 > Tˆ2, we know that Tˆ2 > 0⇒ Tˆ1 > 0⇒ dU2/dB1 > 0. But (46) is already suﬃcient for ad− bc < 0 and
af − ce < 0, which implies that Tˆ2 > 0. Therefore, (46) is a suﬃcient condition for dU2/dB1 > 0.
(46) implies that
D <
αL
T
·
1− d2(1−φ)
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸
< 2D
which is equivalent to
d1−φh(B)
θBθ
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
<
·
h(B)− 1
Bθ
+
gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸³
1− d2(1−φ)
´
<
2d1−φh(B)
θBθ
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
which is equivalent to (??):
d1−φ
1− d2(1−φ)
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
<
θBθ
h(B)
·
h(B)− 1
Bθ
+
gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸
<
2d1−φ
1− d2(1−φ)
£
2 (φ− 1)− θ
¡
1 + d1−φ
¢¤
The right hand side is exactly two times the left hand side. It can be shown that both left hand side and
right hand side have a hump-shaped relationship with φ, and the expressions tend to zero as φ tends to infinity.
Moreover, for any given φ, both expressions decrease with d, and increase without bound as d decreases towards
one. The expressions are graphed as functions of φ in Figure 1. Note that the right hand side expression is the same
as the right hand side expression in the last set of inequalities. The left hand side expression is exactly one half
times the right hand side expression. Therefore, it also has a hump-shaped relationship with φ and also decreases
with d. It tends to infinity as d tends to one. Therefore, from case (b) of Figure 1, we see that for any given φ,
it is possible for there to be positive externality when d is suﬃcient large but not too large. Therefore, we have:
∂Uj
∂Bi > 0 where i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i, i.e. there is positive cross-border externality of strengthening inventive step
requirement by a country, when φ and d are both intermediate in value.
Best Response Functions under Symmetry
43
In this notes, we try to derive the best response function under symmetry, and then show that the second order
condition is satisfied.
bT1 (ad− bc)
=
−
£
h(B1)(1 + d1−φ)− 1
¤
(1− d1−φ)
Bθ1
·
h0(B1)(1 + d1−φ)
h(B1)(1 + d1−φ)− 1
− θ
B1
¸
×
½·
h(B2)− 1
Bθ2
+
gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸ h
1− d2(1−φ)
i
−
·
d1−φh(B2)
θBθ2
¡
φ− θd1−φ − 1
¢
+ (φ− θ − 1) d
1−φ
θBθ1
¸¾
+
·
d1−φh(B1)
θBθ1
¡
φ− 1− θd1−φ
¢
+ (φ− θ − 1) d
1−φ
θBθ2
¸"
d1−φ
¡
1− d1−φ
¢
Bθ1
#
θ
B1
bT2 (ad− bc)
= −
"
d1−φ
¡
1− d1−φ
¢
Bθ1
#
θ
B1
×
½·
h(B1)− 1
Bθ1
+
gL
ρ− gLθ (1− η)
¸ h
1− d2(1−φ)
i
−
·
d1−φh(B1)
θBθ1
¡
φ− θd1−φ − 1
¢
+ (φ− θ − 1) d
1−φ
θBθ2
¸¾
+
£
h(B1)(1 + d1−φ)− 1
¤
(1− d1−φ)
Bθ1
×
·
h0(B1)(1 + d1−φ)
h(B1)(1 + d1−φ)− 1
− θ
B1
¸ ·
d1−φh(B2)
θBθ2
¡
φ− 1− θd1−φ
¢
+ (φ− θ − 1) d
1−φ
θBθ1
¸
The best response function of country 1 is given by (35), which can be re-written as:
−2θ +



·³
T1
T2
´− 1θ × w1w2d¸1−φB1Tˆ1 +B1Tˆ2·³
T1
T2
´− 1θ × w1w2d¸1−φ + 1



= 0
Since an increase in B1 leads to an increase in T1T2 , the eﬀect of B1 on
·³
T1
T2
´− 1θ × w1w2d¸1−φ is negative.
Since Tˆ1 > Tˆ2, the eﬀect of
·³
T1
T2
´− 1θ × w1w2d¸1−φ on the second term on the LHS is positive. Therefore an
increase in B1 leads to a decrease of the second term on the LHS so far as its eﬀect on
·³
T1
T2
´− 1θ × w1w2d¸1−φ
is concerned. Under symmetry,
·³
T1
T2
´− 1θ × w1w2d¸1−φ = dφ−1 > 1. From the first two equations above, we
believe it is true that for any given B2, an increse in B1 leads to a decrease in d
φ−1B1Tˆ1+B1Tˆ2
dφ−1+1 . Therefore,
we believe that an increase in B1 leads to a decrease in the second term on the LHS, which means that
the second order condition is satisfied.
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Figure 1. Curve X = LHS of equation (37); curve Y = RHS of 
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Figure 2A 
Nash Equilibrium under a Required Inventive Step IP Regime for Chor and Lai (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2B 
Nash Equilibrium under a Patent Length IP Regime for Grossman and Lai (2004) 
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Figure 3 
The marginal benefit and marginal cost of increased required inventive step 
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